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I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2-2(3)(e)(iv)(14)(1996).
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

Did the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining correctly conclude the Petitioner

failed to demonstrate the gas well Operators1 acted wrongfully or inequitably?
Standard of review: This Court should reverse the Board's findings of facts only if
they are not supported by substantial evidence. Drake v. Indus. Comm 'n of Utah, 939
P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1997). However, the application of the law to those facts is
appropriately reviewed under the "correctness" standard, but the reviewing court may
give varying amounts of deference to the decision maker. Id. at. The application of the
facts to the law for this issue was highly fact-dependent and required the Board to weigh
and balance the acts and omissions of the parties to determine if equitable relief was
warranted. For these reasons the Court should give the Board very broad discretion in
reaching the conclusion that equitable relief was not warranted in this case. See Dept. of
Human Serv. v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997); Trolley Square Ass'n. v. Nielsen,
886 P. 2d 6165 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), (cited in Drake v. Indus. Comm fn of Utah, 939 P.2d
177, 182 (Utah 1997)).

1

The operators of the two wells in question are the Respondents River Gas
Corporation, Texaco Exploration and Production, Inc., and Dominion Reserves-Utah, Inc.
1

B. Did the Board err in concluding that the Operators5 invitation to join a federal
exploratory unit satisfied the statutory requirement of an "offer" under the Utah Oil and
Gas Conservation Act?
Standard of review: Findings of fact should be reversed only if they are not
supported by substantial evidence. See Drake, at 181. However, the application of the
law to those facts is appropriately reviewed on the correctness standard, on which the
reviewing court may give varying amounts of deference to the decision maker. Id. at
Trolley Square Ass'n. v. Nielsen, 886 P.2d 61,65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Because the facts
in this case are unique to the customs of the oil and gas industry, and because the
legislature granted the Board broad authority to implement the Utah Oil and Gas
Conservation Act, the Court should give substantial deference to the Board's conclusions
regarding the application of the law on this issue. Id.; accord Morton Int'l, Inc. v.
A uditing Div. of State Tax Comm yn, 814 P.2d 5 81 (Utah 1991).
C. Did the Board err in concluding that the Operators' offer to lease the
landowners'2 mineral estate satisfied the statutory requirement of an "offer" under the
Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act?
Standard of review: Findings of fact should be reversed only if they are not
supported by substantial evidence. Drake at 181. Application of the law to those facts is

2

The "landowners" are the individuals from whom Petitioner derived his oil and
gas interests in this matter, and are identified in the Factual Background section of this
Brief.
2

appropriately reviewed under the correctness standard, but the reviewing court may
nonetheless give varying amounts of deference to the decision maker. Id. ; Morton Int'l,
Inc. v. Auditing Div. of State Tax Comm % 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). Similar to above,
the Court should give substantial deference to the Board's conclusions regarding the
application of the law to the facts on this issue.
D. Do the terms and conditions of the Board's forced pooling order violate the
statutory requirement that the order be "just and reasonable?"
Standard of review: Application of law to facts is appropriately reviewed on the
correctness standard, but the reviewing court may give varying amounts of deference to
the decision maker. Drake at 181. Because of the technical nature of the facts, the
customs in the oil and gas industry, and the legislature's delegation of authority to the
Board to implement the Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act, the Court should give
substantial deference to the Board's application of law to the facts on this issue.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The specific statute at issue is the Oil & Gas Conservation Act, Utah Code Ann. §
40-6-1 through § 40-6-18 (1998). (Attached as Addendum 1.) The administrative rule at
issue is Utah Admin. Code § 649-2-9 (2000). (Attached as Addendum 2.)
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal of an Order of the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining in Docket No.

3

2000-009, Cause No. 243-5, dated October 4, 2000 (Order). The case concerns the rights
and responsibilities of both the mineral owners and well Operators of a coalbed methane
gas pool. The law in this matter is controlled by the Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-1(1998), as interpreted previously by this Court in Cowling v.
Board of Oil Gas & Mining, 830 P.2d 220 (Utah 1991). A copy of this case is attached
as Addendum 4.
The Petitioner owns the interests of landowners whose lands were being drained
from two gas wells located near their property. Prior to the drilling of the wells the
landowners repeatedly declined to lease their mineral rights to the well Operators or to
join a federal exploratory unit to share well production. Although the landowners were
on notice they were being drained, they failed to timely protect their interests under the
rule of capture, or to timely file a Request for Agency Action with the Board to vest their
rights to a share of production under the Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act.
Eventually the landowners sought relief from the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining,
which granted their request to force the well Operators to share the production from the
wells. However, because the Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the well Operators had
acted wrongfiilly, the Board did not force the well owners to share any production from
the well prior to the time the landowners initially sought relief from the Board. Petitioner
challenges that finding. The Board's decision is included here as Addendum 3.

4

B.

Course of Proceedings
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1997) and Utah Code Ann. § 63-

46(b)- 16(4)(d) (1997), Petitioner has appealed the Board's Order directly to the Utah
Supreme Court.
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents generally concur with Petitioners statement of facts, but believes the
following eleven facts are determinative of the issues on appeal:
The federally authorized Drunkards Wash Exploratory Unit ("DW Unit") was
approved effective December 28, 1990, approximately five years before the first well in
question was drilled. (Petitioner's Brief at 6; R. 225.) The DW Unit is controlled by the
Unit Agreement and Unit Operating Agreement, and administered by the well Operators
and the scientists and petroleum engineers at the fluid minerals branch of the United
States Bureau of Land Management ("BLM"). (Petitioner's Brief at 6; R. 225.).
As required under Federal Regulations governing federal exploratory unit
formation and operations (see 43 C.F.R. § 3181.3) (1999), all of the uncommitted owners,
including the landowners in this case, were provided opportunities to join the DW Unit
through correspondence in 1990 and 1991. (R. 360-62.)
It is undisputed that, in addition to being offered the opportunity to join the DW
Unit, the landowners were offered the opportunity to lease their mineral interests to the
well Operators (Petitioner's Brief at 8-9, 10-11; R. 352-57; 365-420; R. 573 Hrg. Tr.

5

121:7-123:17; 125:22-126:19 (August 23, 2000.)) It is undisputed that the landowners
declined, either affirmatively or by their non-responsiveness, to join the DW Unit or to
lease their mineral interests to the well Operators. (Petitioner's Brief pgs. 8-9; R. 573,
Hrg.Tr. 144:6-151:10.)
These uncommitted owners include the landowners whom Petitioner represents in
this case: LaRue Layne, Terry T. Olsen & Juretta L. Olsen, Trustees under Trust
Agreement dated 11/5/85 and Trustees as named in that certain Warranty Deed dated
9/25/87 and recorded in Book 277, Page 268, Carbon County Records, Morris Orvill
Alexander, individually and as Trustee as named in that certain Warranty Deed dated
9/25/87 and recorded in Book 277, Page 268, Carbon County Records, Rita Beck, Teri
Layne, and Kelly Layne-Benning (collectively "Landowners" or the "Olsen Family"),
who own 65.736531 % of the minerals in Unit No. 1 and 16.28895 % of the minerals in
Unit No. 2 (R. 341; 573, Hrg. Tr. 75:13), and Carbon County which originally owned and
now again owns 1.277511 % of the minerals in Unit No. 2. (R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 10:7-10.)
With respect to the Olsen Family, LaRue Layne, whom the well Operators had
been informed and assured "spoke" for all members of the Olsen Family (R. 573, Hrg. Tr.
120:17-121:6), was invited to lease or to join the DW Unit between 1991 and 1993, but
did not respond to the offers. (R. 352-57.) After previous attempts to join their interests
were ignored or refused, the well Operators sent certified letters dated July 20, 1995,
inviting Mrs. Layne and the remaining Olsen Family members to either lease or commit

6

their interests to the DW Unit (Petitioner's Brief at 8-9) as working interest owners on the
same terms as any other working interest owners in their respective positions. (R. 376420.) All knew or should have known of the well Operators' plans, as DW Unit
Operator, to drill on the captured lands. The Board found the terms and conditions of the
offers were reasonable and in good faith. (R 562.) The landowners failed to respond, or
to make a counter proposal to the offers. (Petitioner's Brief at 9; R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 126:1012.) In 1998, the well Operators offered to purchase the interests of certain Olsen Family
members (Petitioner's Brief at 10-11.; R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 78:17-79:9), but acceptable terms
could not be reached except with Mr. John Joe Skinner (Petitioner's Brief at 11.)
The locations and drilling of both wells were authorized by the Utah Division of
Oil, Gas & Mining's approval of applications for permit to drill and the Board's Order
entered in Cause No. 243-2 on July 13, 1999. (R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 57:2-11.) Both wells are
located on leaseholds owned solely by the well Operators.
At the time the wells in question, the Utah 5-94 and the Woolstenhulme 5-266,
were drilled the lands were subject to the Board's general well siting rule (Utah Admin.
Code R649-3-2), which rule was later suspended by virtue of the Board's Order entered
in Cause No. 243-3.
The well Operators presented evidence at the Board hearing that the geological
data and offsetting well production history, as well as the options available for water
disposal existing at the time the Utah 5-94 and Woolstenhulme 5-266 wells were drilled,

7

supported the existence of substantial risks assumed by the Operators in proceeding with
the drilling of the wells. (R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 200:10-203:9.)
The leases that Petitioner acquired from the Olsen Family included terms no more
favorable than the terms in the leases the well Operators had previously offered to them,
except for a clause which prohibits Petitioner's joinder of the leases to the DW Unit
without the lessors' express consent. (R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 95:18, 19.)
The Petitioner's lands were not subject to any spacing order until entry of the
Board's Order in Cause No. 243-3 effective January 26, 2000. Utah Admin. Code R6493-2(1999).
In establishing the drilling and spacing units for the production of gas, including
coalbed methane, the Board expressly rejected Petitioner's request that the Order be
retroactively effective to the dates of first production of the Utah 5-94 and
Woolstenhulme 5-266 wells as to each respective unit. (R. 564.)
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A.

The Court Should Review The Issues On Appeal With Substantial Deference To
The Board's Findings and Conclusions
As described above, the first issue on appeal was a highly fact dependent weighing

and balancing of the acts and omissions of the various parties to determine whether
equitable relief was warranted. For these reasons the Court should give great deference to
the Board's findings of fact and conclusions of law on this issue. See Trolley Square at
65. The second and third issues should be reviewed under the correctness standard but
8

with substantial deference to the Board's findings and conclusions. The three issues on
appeal are described below.
B.

Petitioner Failed To Demonstrate The Well Operators Acted Wrongfully And
Therefore. He Was Not Entitled To Equitable Relief
Petitioner sought a pooling order from the Board to be applied retroactively to the

date the wells in question first produced coalbed methane gas. The Board granted the
pooling order but applied it retroactive only to the date of the prior spacing order, not to
the date of first production.
Both the Board and the parties agree that a forced pooling order is to be applied
retroactively to a date no earlier than the date of entry of the prior "spacing order" unless
a party acted wrongfully or fraudulently,3 in which case the Board has the equitable
authority to make the pooling order retroactive to some time prior to the spacing order. In
this case the "wrongful" conduct test is particularly stringent because no spacing order
had yet been entered, and therefore, the rights of the parties were controlled solely by the
law of capture, i.e., the parties have no obligation to protect each others interests.
Petitioner failed to demonstrate any conduct which was wrongful or otherwise warranted
equitable relief. In fact, the Petitioner's landowners failed to timely protect their interest
in production prior to entry of a spacing order, which is a waiver of their interests until
the spacing order is entered.

3

Adkins v. Board of Oil Gas and Mining, 926 P.2d 880, 884 (1996).
See also Cowling v. Bd of Oil Gas & Mining, 830 P.2d 220, 228 (Utah 1991).
9

C.

The Offers Made by the Well Operators Satisfied The Statutory Requirements of
An "Offer9 And, As a Result, The Landowners' Refusal to Accept Those Offers
Made Them "Nonconsenting Owners''
In response to the Petitioner's request for forced pooling, the well Operators

sought a nonconsent penalty against Petitioner's landowners to compensate the Operators
for the risks they incurred in drilling the two wells in question. The Board found that the
Operators carried their burden of proof by demonstrating they complied with the statutory
requirement that they make written offers to the landowners prior to drilling the wells.
Petitioner argued the offers did not meet the statutory requirements because they
were not on a per well basis. Based upon the language of both the statute and the
applicable regulations, and based upon the holding of the Cowling case, the Board
rejected Petitioner's narrow interpretation of the statute and found that the Operators'
offers to lease and to join a federal exploratory unit were acceptable types of offers under
the statute.
Because the landowners declined to accept the offers made to them the Board
deemed them "nonconsenting owners" and, as required by law, properly imposed a
nonconsent penalty on the Petitioner's landowners.
D.

The Terms of the Pooling Order Are Just And Reasonable
Finally, Petitioner argues the terms and conditions of the Board's forced pooling

order are unjust and unreasonable in violation of the terms of the forced pooling statute.

10

Many of the terms and conditions of a forced pooling order are mandated by
statute,4 and to the extent Petitioner is requesting that the Board modify those mandatory
terms, it does not have the authority to do so. To the extent Petitioner is arguing that the
Board imposed other, discretionary terms, which it believes are unjust or unreasonable,
the Board disagrees. Each of Petitioner's concerns arise directly from the other issues
Petitioner has raised in this appeal. In summary, Petitioner's third issue on appeal is a
reformulation of its first two arguments, and whether the terms and conditions are
"unjust" and "unreasonable" would depend upon whether or not this Court upholds the
Board's findings of fact and conclusions of law in this matter.
VII. ARGUMENT
A.

Substantial Evidence is the Appropriate Standard for Reviewing The First Issue;
The "Correctness" Standard Of Review, With Substantial Deference To The
Board's Conclusions. Is Appropriate for the Second and Third Issues On Appeal
The Board's findings of fact should be reversed only if they are not supported by

substantial evidence. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1997). See also Drake at 181).
The Board's application of the facts to the law, should be reviewed under the
"correctness" standard,.5 but with some deference to the agency. The amount of

4

Seey e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6.5(4)(a)-(e) (1998).

5

Some of the issues on appeal can be viewed as either mixed findings of fact and
law or, perhaps more properly, as the Board's exercise of both its explicit and implicit
powers to interpret the operative provisions of the statutory law it is empowered to
administer.
11

deference a court gives will vary, and falls ".. . anywhere between a review for
'correctness' and a broad 'abuse of discretion' standard." Drake, 939 P.2d at 181. For
example, highly fact-dependent issues and issues of equity are granted very broad
discretion.6 Fact-specific cases for which the courts find it difficult to formulate a "factspecific rule of law" are given a moderate amount of discretion. Id. at 182. Finally, those
areas of the law where a "serviceable" legal standard has arisen will be provided the least
amount of deference. Id. at 182.
As to the first issue on appeal, Petitioner expressly agreed the Cowling case
describes the appropriate legal test in this matter (R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 234.) He only argued
that, under the facts of this case, an equitable remedy should be awarded. This is clearly
fact-finding followed by application of facts in equity. The Court should review the
Board's findings of facts under the very deferential substantial evidence standard. The
Court should review the application of those facts to the law under the correctness
standard, but give great deference to the Board's discretion to grant equitable relief.
Irizzary at 678; Trolley Square, 886 P.2d at 65. The Board, which by law is composed of
members knowledgeable in mining and oil and gas matters,7 has been delegated authority

6

Dept. of Human Serv. v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997) (Fact intensive
circumstances weigh heavily against the Court substituting its judgment for that of the
fact finder); Trolley Square Associates v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994),
(cited by Drake at 182).
7

See Utah Code Ann. 40-6-4(2)(a) - (e) (1998).
12

from the Legislature to engage in fact-finding of a very technical nature for purposes of
implementing the Oil and Gas Conservation Act. The Board also relies upon the
guidance of the geologists and petroleum engineers at the Division of Oil, Gas and
Mining, to help sort through the factual issues.(R 573, Hrg. Tr. 252:15 - 255; 10.) For
these reasons the Court should reverse to the Board's findings of fact only if they are not
supported by substantial evidence, and it should give deference to the Board's application
of those facts to the law.
The second major issue on appeal involves the types, terms, and conditions of
offers made by the well Operators to the landowners. This is pure fact finding and again,
the Court should reverse the Board's findings of fact only if not supported by substantial
evidence. However, the Board applied the relevant facts to the type of statutory "offer"
required to be made under the Act,8 thus this is a mixed question of fact and law. As
described above, because of the technical nature of the fact finding and the nature of the
authority delegated to it by the Legislature, the Board believes the Court should review
with substantial deference to the Board's discretion.
The third issue on appeal is whether the terms and conditions of the forced pooling
order are "just and reasonable" as required by the Act. There is no dispute that the legal

8

The Board believes there are numerous types of "offers" which may be made
under Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-2(11), and that the Legislature delegated to the Board the
authority to determine which "offers" satisfy the Legislature's intent. Petitioner appears
to argue the Legislature narrowly limited the types of offers which can be made.
13

test is "just and reasonable." The only issue is whether the terms and conditions of the
order satisfy that legal test, i.e., again a question of mixed fact and law. For the reasons
described above the Board believes the Court should review the Board's conclusions for
correctness by reviewing the Board's exercise of discretion for reasonableness.
Justice Durham's analysis in Semeco Indus., Inc. v. Auditing Div. of State Tax
Comm 'n, 849 P.2d 1167 (Utah 1993), and this Court's opinions in Bennion v. ANR Prod.
Co., 819 P.2d 343 (Utah 1991), and Morton InV7, Inc., 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991), all
support deference to the Board's findings and conclusions in this case regarding issues
two and three. As Justice Durham explains Morton in her Semeco dissent:
In the absence of discernible legislative intent concerning this specific
question and issue, a choice among permissible interpretations of the statute
is largely a policy determination. The agency that has been granted
authority to administer the statute is the appropriate body to make such a
determination. Indeed, both the legislative history to Section 63-46b-16,
and our prior cases suggest that an appellate court should not substitute its
judgment for the agency's judgment concerning the wisdom of the agency's
policy. When there is no discernible legislative intent concerning the
specific issue the legislature has, in effect, left the issue unresolved. In such
a case it is appropriate to conclude that the legislature has delegated
authority to decide the issue.
Semeco, 849 P.2d at 1173 (Durham, J., dissenting). Justice Durham cautions that both
courts and attorneys distinguish between whether an agency action is an interpretation or
application of law reviewed under sub-section (4)(d), or "merely an exercise of implicitly
delegated discretion to interpret or apply the law, reviewed under Utah Code Ann. §6346b-16(4)(h)(i)." M a t 1174.
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B.

Petitioner Failed To Carry The Heavy Burden of Demonstrating That, Under the •
Law of Capture. The Well Operators Had Acted Wrongfully Or Inequitably
The parties agree the first issue on appeal is controlled by this Court's ruling in

Cowling. The Cowling opinion directly addressed where the law of capture ends and the
Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act begins. Cowling v. Bd. of Oil Gas & Mining, 830
P.2d 220, 224 (Utah 1991). Because the rights and obligations of landowners and well
operators under the law of capture differs significantly from their rights under the
Conservation Act, it is necessary that the boundary be clear.9 Pursuant to Cowling that
boundary is the date a "spacing order" is entered. Under Cowling, from the time a well
begins production until the time a spacing order is entered there is no statutory or
regulatory mechanism controlling person's rights, and the landowners and well operators
are subject solely to the law of capture. Id.
The first issue on appeal is the appropriate retroactive date for the application of a
forced pooling order. Forced pooling orders always occur after entry of a spacing order
and are a creature of the Conservation Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6.5 (1998);
Cowling at 226. In Cowling, the Utah Supreme Court held that the Utah Board of Oil,
Gas and Mining should not make a pooling order effective prior to entry of a spacing
order. Id. at 229. However, the Cowling Court also indicated that the law of capture was

9

As a matter of law, the Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act does not abrogate the
law of capture in Utah until such time as the Board enters a spacing order. Cowling, 830
P.2d at 224-226.
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not without limits. If a well operator engages in "wrongful" or "inequitable" conduct, the
Court may remedy that wrong by equitably applying the pooling order retroactive to some
time prior to the date of the spacing order. Id. at 228-229.10 However, the remedy does
not arise under the Conservation Act. It is an equitable remedy for a wrong which, in the
case of Cowling, allegedly occurred during the period the law of capture applied. The
parties in this case agree that the "wrongful" conduct test is the legal test in this matter,
and the first question on appeal is whether the well Operator acted wrongfully under the
facts of this case.
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed what constitutes "wrongful" conduct in
two oil and gas cases. In Cowling, which involved the drilling of a well prior to entry of a
spacing order, the Court stated the conduct must be "wrongful" or "inequitable" to
override the law of capture. Id. at 228-29. The Cowling Court rejected the argument that
a well operator's delay in seeking a spacing order rose to the level of wrongful or
inequitable conduct, and held that the failure of a landowner to protect their interests was
a waiver of those interests. Id. at 229.
In the second case, Adkins v Board of Oil Gas and Mining, 926 P.2d 880 (1996),
the land surrounding the well had been spaced but the drilling unit in question allegedly
failed to include all areas of land being drained by that unit's well. In Adkins, the

10

Prior to entry of a spacing order correlative rights are merely an "opportunity" to
produce a just and equitable share without waste. Cowling at 225. Those "rights" only
vest into a quantifiable right upon entry of a spacing order. Id.
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Conservation Act had been triggered by entry of a spacing order, which of course,
"modifies" the law of capture and quantifies ones "correlative rights." Cowling, 830 P.2d
at 224-26. The plaintiff in Adkins sought relief many years after his property had been
drained, and argued that the failure of the well operator to seek to modify the shape of the
drilling unit to include his property located on an adjacent drilling block, constituted
wrongful conduct. The Adkins Court disagreed, citing Cowling for the position that the
alleged misconduct must be egregious, rising to a level of "fraud or inequitable conduct."
Adkins, 926 P.2d at 884.
This Court makes clear in Adkins that the failure of the landowners to protect their
interests, even after the Conservation Act is triggered, is a waiver of those rights. Id. at
884. Put another way, at no time does the well operator have an affirmative legal
obligation to seek a spacing order, or to seek to modify an existing spacing order - the
burden is on the landowners to protect their interests. As described in Cowling, prior to
entry of a spacing order the "inequitable" or "fraudulent" test is especially stringent
because, prior to entry of a spacing order there are no quantified correlative rights, and
the well operator has no duty to the adjoining landowners under the law of capture.
Cowling, 830 P.2d at 224. Since they have no duty to each other, they have no legal duty
to seek a spacing order. Under the law of capture the landowners and well operators have
no legal duty to protect each others' interests except as may arise as between any two
individuals, i.e., a general duty not to commit fraud. A landowner who fails to seek relief
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under the law of capture waives his rights until entry of a spacing order. Adkins, 926 P.2d
at 883-84; Cowling, 830 P.2d at 228.
In the case at bar it is undisputed that the landowners' property had not been
spaced at the time the wells were drilled. (Petitioner's Brief at 13-14; 21; 24; 35.) As a
result, the law of capture controlled the rights and obligations of the parties. The well
owner was under no duty to seek a spacing order; therefore, in the absence of wrongful
conduct, the Operators' failure to do so does not constitute "wrongful" or "fraudulent"
conduct. Thus, under Cowling, the pooling order should apply retroactively only to the
date of the spacing order. {See R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 234.) For this reason the Board's Order
should be upheld.
C.

The Board Correctly Concluded That The Offers Made To The Landowners
Satisfied The Statutory Requirements For A Written "Offer." And The
Landowners Failure to Accept The Offers Resulted In them Becoming
"Nonconsenting Owners"
The second issue on appeal is the Board's conclusion that the landowners were

made written offers to participate in the drilling of the wells, that they did not accept
those offers, and as a result, the landowners satisfied the statutory definition of
"nonconsenting owners." u Accordingly, and at the Operators' request, the Board
imposed on the landowners a statutorily mandated "nonconsent penalty" to compensate
the Operators for the risks they took in drilling the wells.

Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-2(11) (1998).
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Petitioner makes two arguments to support his appeal on this issue. His first
argument is that prior to entry of a spacing order no offer of any kind can satisfy the
statutory requirements for an "offer," and therefore, it is impossible for the landowners to
be "nonconsenting owners." See e.g., Petitioner's Brief 17, 34, 35.12 Petitioner did not
directly raise this issue before the Board, and in his "Statement of Issues & Standard of
Review" section of his Brief he does not cite to the administrative record showing when
and where this legal issue was made below or preserved for appeal. Failure to raise an
issue during the administrative proceeding is a waiver of that argument. See Brown &
Root Indus. Serv. v Indus. Comm 'n, 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1977). Petitioner should not
be allowed to argue on appeal that the Board erred "as a matter of law" when he failed to
raise this legal issue for the Board's consideration.
The second issue Petitioner raises on appeal, one raised before the Board, is
whether the offers made by the Operators were of a type which satisfied the statutory
requirements. Petitioner argued below that the only type of offer which is acceptable
under the Act is an offer made on a "proportionate" per well (single well) basis.
(Petitioner's Brief at 36-40.) The Board rejected such a narrow interpretation of Utah
Code Ann. § 40-6-2(11) and found that broader types of offers, including offers to lease

12

Petitioner's first argument appears to stem from a realization that the types of
offers which he argued below should have been made by the Operators to the landowners
could not possibly be made without prior entry of a spacing order. On appeal he has refocused his argument from one based upon the facts surrounding the actual offers made,
to a legal question of whether any offer could have satisfied the statute.
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and offers for proportionate cost sharing for more than one well, satisfied both the
statutory and regulatory requirements of the Act.
Without waiver of its objection to the Petitioner's failure to raise the first issue
before the Board, the Board responds to the two arguments as follows:
1.

Background and Purposes of the Nonconsent Penalty

The Act provides that the Board shall impose on "nonconsenting owners" a
nonconsent penalty between 150% and 300% of the drilling costs described at Utah Code
Ann. § 40-6-6.5(4)(d)(i)(D) (1998). The purpose of the penalty is not to penalize, but to
compensate those persons who participate in the risk of drilling the well in the event the
well is ultimately successful and nonparticipating landowners attempt to force pool their
way into co-owning the successful well.
The Supreme Court views the sliding scale nonconsent penalty as compensation
for those who assumed the financial risk of drilling the well. The penalty is
incentive for voluntary participation, rather than punitive damages, for
recalcitrance - hence a risk-compensation penalty. Also, it ensures that
nonconsenting owners do not benefit from a successful well for which they
assumed no risk.
Phillip Wm. Lear, Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Law and Practice, Utah L. Rev. 89,
127 (1998). The Act requires the Board to impose a penalty within a statutory range of
150% to 300%, so the penalty amount is commensurate with the risk taken by those who
paid for the well. However, as correctly pointed out by the Petitioner, before imposing a
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penalty for failing to participate in, and taking the risk of, drilling the well, the Act
requires that the landowner be provided an opportunity to participate in the drilling risk.
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6.5 (1998).
2.

Statutory and Regulatory Definitions Indicate Various Types of Offers are
Acceptable if Made in Good Faith

Both the Act and the applicable regulation address the definition of a "nonconsenting owner." A "nonconsenting owner" is defined in the Act as " an owner who
after written notice does not consent in advance to the drilling and operation of the well or
agree to bear his proportionate share of the costs." Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-2(11) (1998).
The Utah oil and gas regulation which further refines what constitutes a nonconsenting
owner states in relevant part:
R649 -2-9 Refusal to Agree.
1. An owner shall be deemed to have refused to agree to bear his
proportionate share of the costs of the drilling and operation of a well under
section 40-6-6(6) if:
1.1. The operator of the proposed well has, in good faith, attempted to reach
agreement with such owner for the leasing of the owner's mineral interest or for
that owner's voluntary participation in the drilling of the well.
1.2 The owner and the operator have been unable to agree upon terms for
the leasing of the owner's interest or for the owner's participation in the drilling of
the well.
2. If the operator of the proposed well shall fail to attempt, in good faith, to
reach agreement with the owner for the leasing of that owner's mineral interests or
for voluntary participation by that owner in the well prior to the filing of a Request
for Agency Action for involuntary pooling of the interests in the drilling unit under
Section 40-6-6(6) then, upon written request and after notice and hearing, the
hearing on the Request for Agency Action for involuntary pooling may, at the
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discretion of the board or its designated hearing examiner, be delayed for a
period not to exceed 30 days, to allow for negotiations between the operator
and the owner.
Utah Admin. Code R649-2-9 (2000)(emphasis added).
This regulatory definition of a "nonconsenting owner" expressly allows the
operator to make at least two different types of offers: 1) an offer to agree to the drilling
or operation of a well, or 2) or an offer to "agree to bear his proportionate share of costs."
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-2(11) (1998). The first type of offer is very broad and is only
limited by the requirement that the offer involve the landowner agreeing to the drilling or
operation of one or more wells. It does not mean the landowner must be offered a
proportionate "working interest" in a single well.13 The second type of offer is also
broad, and only requires some type of proportionate cost sharing by the owner.14
As noted above, regulation R649-2-9 expressly states that "leases" of mineral
interests are an acceptable type of offer under the statute. Therefore, contrary to the

13

Examples of this type of offer would include offers to lease the landowner's
mineral interests in exchange for agreeing to the drilling of a well which will drain their
property. Another example would be an offer to join a federal exploratory unit in
exchange for the landowners agreeing to the drilling of a well which will drain their
property.
14

An example of this type would include an offer to join a federal exploratory unit,
where costs are shared between more than one well. A lease however, would not satisfy
this second type of offer because a lease, by itself, usually does not involve cost sharing.
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Petitioner's interpretation, acceptable types of offers are not restricted to those made on a
proportionate cost sharing or on a per well basis; other types of offers satisfy the
regulatory requirements.
Just as important, R649-2-9 focuses on whether the offers are made in good faith,
i.e., the gist of the statute and regulation is not to narrowly restrict the types of offers
available, but to make sure the offer is made in good faith. Both the statute and the
regulation15 encourage the parties to voluntarily reach agreement before seeking
involuntary pooling. This supports the Board's conclusion that various types of offers
may be made other than the limited, single type of offer argued for by the Petitioner.16
For the above reasons, the Board believes that reasonable and good faith offers of
a type customarily made in the oil and gas industry are expressly and implicitly
authorized by both the statute and the regulations. Those types of acceptable offers
include offers to lease and offers to join federal exploratory units.
3.

The Landowners Received Offers to Lease and Offers to Join the Federal
Exploratory Unit

The landowners in this case were members of a family headed by Ms. LaRue
Layne. It is undisputed that at least two types of written offers were extended to Ms.
Layne prior to the drilling of each well. (Petitioner's Brief at 8; R. 352-57; 360-62; 365-

15

Utah Admin. Code R649-2-9(2).

16

More types of offers, not less, would be to the benefit of the landowners, and
voluntarily allow them to participate in the pool in various ways.
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420; R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 121:7-123:17; 125:22-126:19.) Between 1991 and 1993, two years
before drilling the first well, the Operators invited Ms. Layne and the family members to
either join the Federal Drunkards Wash Exploratory Unit or to lease their mineral
interests.17 (R. 360-62; R. 352-57; 365-420; R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 121:7-123:17; 125:22126:19; 127:6-133:13; 152:8-163:20.) The Board found the terms of the offers
reasonable and made in good faith. (R. 559; See also R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 129:8-24; 131:20132:12; 133:14-134:21; 140:4-20.) Ms. Layne did not accept the offers. (See e.g. R.573,
Hrg. Tr. 133:-10-13; 135:5-8.)
Prior to the second well being drilled the Operators offered to lease Ms. Layne's
and the other family members' mineral interests. The Board found the terms of the lease
offer reasonable and in good faith. Ms. Layne and all but one of her family members,
failed to accept the offer to lease. One landowner, Mr. Skinner, accepted the offer to
lease. (Petitioner's Brief at 11.) Some family members followed up with questions but
did not accept the offer. (R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 149:19-150:17.) Ms. Layne also represented to
the Operators that she represented the interests of the other family members. (R. 573,
Hrg.Tr. 135:9-19.)

17

An offer to join the field wide federal unit would mean that the participants
would have an opportunity to participate in, and be responsible for the costs of, some or
all wells in the unit, regardless of whether or not they are draining their property. Put
another way, instead of a greater proportionate interest in the single well draining their
property, they would have an opportunity to participate in a lesser proportionate interest
in the larger number of wells in the field.
24

The Petitioner has failed to present a legal argument why an offer to join a federal
unit on reasonable terms does not satisfy the terms of the statute and regulations.
Similarly, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate how the offers to lease do not satisfy the
regulatory requirement that an offer to lease is an acceptable form of offer. This is
especially true if the landowners already rejected the offer to join the federal unit. An
offer to lease provided the landowners a second, very common, alternative to joining the
federal unit, and was protective of their rights.
4.

Summary of Second Issue on Appeal

In summary, for the first time Petitioner argues that ;;a mineral owner cannot be
rendered a 'nonconsenting owner' under the Conservation Act until after the landowner's
correlative rights in a pool have been defined by a spacing order." (Petitioner's Brief at
17, 34.) Put another way, Petitioner argues it is impossible to make any offer which
satisfies the statutory requirements of the Act prior to entry of a spacing order. Therefore,
he argues, it was impossible for his landowners to be subject to a nonconsent penalty in
any amount. (Petitioner's Brief at 34, 35.)
Petitioner's narrow interpretation of the definition of a nonconsenting owner, Utah
Code Ann. § 40-6-2(11) is contrary to both the text of the definition, which allows offers
on a cost sharing basis, and to the applicable regulations, which expressly authorize offers
such as mineral leases. The Board believes that the legislative intent behind the definition
of a "nonconsenting owner" was not to limit the types of offers which can be made, as
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long as they are reasonable, bona fide, good faith offers which are customary in the
industry. The broad language of the definition supports a broad interpretation of what
constitutes an offer. In addition, this Court made clear in Cowling that the rule of capture
is alive in Utah, and that landowners have an obligation to protect themselves from being
drained. Cowling, 839 P.2d at 228. ("An owner's failure to take action to establish and
protect his or her interest in production prior to the entry of a spacing order constitutes a
waiver of that interest until a drilling unit is established.") Under the Petitioner's theory,
these two concepts would be nullified if it is impossible for a well Operator to make an
offer prior to entry of a spacing order because sole responsibility for seeking a spacing
order would be shifted to the well Operators, or they forfeit any right to a nonconsent
penalty. This, of course, relieves the landowners of any responsibility to protect their
own rights. Either the well Operator seeks the spacing order or the landowner can sit
back and see if the well is successful before forcing their way into the well risk-free and
with no penalty. This is contrary to the rule of capture and much of the reasoning of
Cowling.
The Board is unaware of any legislative history of the Act to support Petitioner's
interpretation. Nowhere in the definition of "nonconsenting owners" does it indicate that
a spacing order needs to be entered before an offer could be made. If the Legislature
intended such a critical requirement, it is unlikely it would have omitted it from the
definition. To imply a spacing order requirement would be inconsistent with the long and

26

complex forced pooling and nonconsent penalty provisions of the Act, which could be
easily avoided if a spacing order is required by law before any offer can be made.18 The
simplest explanation is usually the correct one. If the Legislature intended a spacing
order was necessary before any offer could be made, it would have expressly included
such a critical requirement in the statute, and not have implied it through a relatively
convoluted interpretation of the definition of "nonconsenting owner." The offers to lease
and the offers to join the federal exploratory unit satisfied the requirements of written
offers under the Act and regulations. The failure of the landowners to accept these offers
resulted in them being "nonconsenting owners" under the Act.
D.

The Terms Of The Pooling Order Are Just and Reasonable
In the third and final section of his Brief the Petitioner argues that: the terms of the

pooling agreement are not just and reasonable; that it "penalizes unsophisticated, absentee
landowners"; that it provides the Operators with more than their just and equitable share;
that it unjustly imposes a 225% nonconsent penalty; and that it allegedly "penalizes"
drained parties for "exercising their rights." Finally, he asserts the Board "abrogated its
responsibilities" under the Act to protect correlative rights by "deferring to the rule of
capture long after the initial exploratory phase of production has ended." (Petitioner's
Brief at 42-44.) The Board disagrees.

18

For example, in North Dakota the Commission in charge of spacing is required
by law to space a well within thirty days of drilling.
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1.

Many Terms Of The Board's Forced Pooling Order Are Mandated By
Statute And Cannot Be Modified By The Board

Forced pooling statutes have been upheld almost without exception for most of the
last one-hundred years. See, Phillip Wm. Lear, Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Law and
Practice, Utah L. Rev. 89, 122 (1998). Like other states' conservation statutes, Utah's
statute mandates that the terms of a forced pooling order be "just and reasonable." Utah
Code Ann. § 40-6-6.5(2Xb) (1998). Many of the terms of a Utah forced pooling order
are mandated by statute, including the minimum amount of a nonconsent penalty, and the
terms and conditions for sharing costs and production. See Utah Code Ann. § 40-66.5(4)-(9) (1998). The Board is not free to change the statutorily mandated provisions,
and once it found the landowners were "nonconsenting owners," it was required by law to
impose at least a 150% nonconsent penalty. See Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6.5 (1998) ("an
amount to be determined by the Board but not less than 150%...."). To the extent the
Petitioner objects to terms required by statute, the Board is without the authority to
change those terms.
2.

Petitioner's Assertions Were Either Not Raised Below Or Are Merely A
Reassertion Of His Prior Arguments

Petitioner asserts that the Act may "penalize unsophisticated, absentee
landowners." (Petitioner's Brief at 41.) Petitioner did not raise below his assertion that
the landowners were '"absentee," and therefore, the Board did not have an opportunity to
determine what constitutes "absentee," whether the landowners were in fact absentee, and
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if so, how much weight to give that consideration.19 Petitioner failed to bring that issue to
the Board's attention. See Brown & Root Indus. Serv., 947 P.2d 671 (Utah 1977).
Because Petitioner did not raise that issue before the Board, it is waived.
As described above, a correlative right is merely an "opportunity" to produce one's
just and equitable share without waste. Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-2(2) (1998). One's
failure to timely protect one's right is a waiver of those rights. Cowling, 830 P.2d at 228.
In this case Petitioner's landowners had numerous options and opportunities to protect
their interests, but failed to do so.
The Board understands the Petitioner's concerns regarding "unsophisticated"
landowners. However, the Petitioner has cited no authority to the Board or to the Court
that the Board had authority under the Act to apply the laws and regulations of the state of
Utah based upon the level of sophistication or financial resources of the parties before it.
The Board believes it is required by law20 to interpret and enforce the legal provisions of
the Act, and the associated regulations, in a consistent and uniform manner, regardless of
whether the parties are large oil and gas companies or individual landowners.

19

Petitioner's citation in his Brief (Petitioner's Brief at 1 citing R. 408) does not
reference ever having argued the alleged "absentee" nature of his landowners in either his
briefs, exhibits, or testimony before the Board. Instead it cites to an exhibit attached to a
copy of the 1995 lease offer made by the well Operators to the landowners. If Petitioner
thought the asserted absentee nature of the landowners was relevant he should have
brought it to the Board's attention and argued it as a factor for the Board's consideration.
He did not.
20

Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-5 (1998).
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In his Brief Petitioner also argues the penalty is unjust and unfair. It is unclear
whether Petitioner is arguing that the imposition of any nonconsent penalty is unjust and
unfair, or whether the amount of the penalty, 225%, is unjust and unfair, or both. The
Board's factual and legal reasons for imposing a nonconsent penalty are described above
in section II in this Brief. Once the Board found the landowners were "nonconsenting
owners" it was required to impose a penalty of "not less than 150%." Utah Code Ann. §
40-6-6.5(4)(d)(i)(D) (1998). For this reason the issue of whether any penalty is unjust or
unfair should be decided under the analysis of whether the landowners were
;;

nonconsenting." The additional 75% of the penalty (150% plus 75% = 225%) was

imposed to compensate the Operator for the exploratory risks inherent in coalbed methane
exploration, and the facts surrounding the two wells in this case. ( R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 255:45.) In addition, the Board considered the amount of a nonconsent penalty it imposed in a
prior but unrelated matter similar to this case. (R. 573, Hrg. Tr. 255:1-3.)
Petitioner also asserts his landowners were penalized for exercising their rights
under the statute. (Petitioner's Brief at 43.) To the extent Petitioner's landowners have
been "penalized", it is because they failed to timely seek a spacing order from the Board,
or otherwise seek to protect their rights after they were on notice there may be oil and gas
under their property, and again after wells were drilled nearby.
Petitioner argues that the '"Pooling Order provides absolutely no incentive for an
Operator to space surrounding uncommitted lands." (Petitioner's Brief at 43.) The Board
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agrees. "Voluntary pooling agreements and forced pooling orders are the mechanisms
used to enforce correlative rights." Cowling, 830 P.2d at 226; See also Phillip Wm. Lear,
Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Law and Practice, Utah L. Rev. 89, 118-121 (1998).
Their purpose is not to encourage petitions for spacing orders. The Board is unaware of
any legal authority which stands for the position that the purpose of a forced pooling
order under the Act is to provide an incentive for an operator to space lands. Petitioner
does not cite any authority for this in its brief. Forced pooling orders are necessary only
when parties cannot voluntarily agree on written pooling terms and conditions. Utah
Code Ann. § 40-6-6.5(2) (1998).
Finally, the Petitioner argues that the Board has "abrogated" its responsibilities by
deferring to the rule of capture "long after the initial exploratory phase of production has
ended." (Petitioner's Brief at 44.) Because Petitioner cites no specific facts or legal
authority in this section of his Brief, it is unclear exactly what issue is being argued. See
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). However, to the extent Petitioner is making a legal argument
that the "rule of capture" applies in Utah only during the "exploratory phase," the Board
does not understand how that relates to the "terms and conditions of the pooling order"
allegedly being unjust. In Cowling the Court expressly and unequivocally held that the
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rule of capture is alive in Utah, and that until correlative rights vest, landowners must
protect their own interests or waive them.21
VIII. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Board should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \

day of April, 2001.

STATE OF UTAH
BOARD OF OIL, GAS & MINING
MARK L, SH^RTLEFF n
Utah Attorney General |

(/ LM

THOMAS A MITCHELL (#3737)
KURT SEEL (#8374)
Assistant Attorneys General
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Telephone: (801) 366-0508
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To the extent the Petitioner is attempting to argue, as it did in its Docketing
Statement, that the Act or the pooling order is unconstitutional, the petitioner failed to
raise before the Board any challenge to the constitutionality of the Act. Brown & Root
Indus. Serv. v. Indus. Comm'n, 947 P.2d 671 (Utah 1977)
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40-6-1. Declaration of public interest.
It is declared to be in the public interest to foster, encourage, and promote the development,
production, and utilization of natural resources of oil and gas in the state of Utah in such a manner
as will prevent waste; to authorize and to provide for the operation and development of oil and
gas properties in such a manner that a greater ultimate recovery of oil and gas may be obtained
and that the correlative rights of all owners may be folly protected; to provide exclusive state
authority over oil and gas exploration and development as regulated under the provisions of this
chapter; to encourage, authorize, and provide for voluntary agreements for cycling, recycling,
pressure maintenance, and secondary recovery operations in order that the greatest possible
economic recovery of oil and gas may be obtained within the state to the end that the land
owners, the royalty owners, the producers, and the general public may realize and enjoy the
greatest possible good from these vital natural resources.

40-6-2. Definitions.
For the purpose of this chapter:
(1) "Board" means the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining.
(2) "Correlative rights" means the opportunity of each owner in a pool to produce his just and
equitable share of the oil and gas in the pool without waste.
(3) "Condensate" means hydrocarbons, regardless of gravity, that:
(a) occur naturally in the gaseous phase in the reservoir; and
(b) are separated from the natural gas as liquids through the process of condensation either in
the reservoir, in the wellbore, or at the surface in field separators.
(4) "Consenting owner" means an owner who consents in advance to the drilling and
operation of a well and agrees to bear his proportionate share of the costs of the drilling and
operation of the well.
(5) "Crude oil" means hydrocarbons, regardless of gravity, that:
(a) occur naturally in the liquid phase in the reservoir; and
(b) are produced and recovered at the wellhead in liquid form.
(6) (a) "Gas" means natural gas, as defined in Subsection (9), natural gas liquids, as defined in
Subsection (10), other gas, as defined in Subsection (14), or any mixture of them.
(b) "Gas" does not include any gaseous or liquid substance processed from coal, oil shale, or
tar sands.
(7) "Illegal oil" or "illegal gas" means oil or gas that has been produced from any well within
the state in violation of this chapter or any rule or order of the board.
(8) "Illegal product" means any product derived in whole or in part from illegal oil or illegal
gas.
(9) (a) "Natural gas" means hydrocarbons that occur naturally in the gaseous phase in the
reservoir and are produced and recovered at the wellhead in gaseous form, except natural gas
liquids as defined in Subsection (10) and condensate as defined in Subsection (3).
(b) "Natural gas" includes coalbed methane gas.
(10) "Natural gas liquids" means hydrocarbons, regardless of gravity, that are separated from
natural gas as liquids in gas processing plants through the process of condensation, absorption,

(11) "Nonconsenting owner" means an owner who after written notice does not consent in
advance to the drilling and operation of a well or agree to bear his proportionate share of the
costs.
(12) (a) "Oil" means crude oil, as defined in Subsection (5), condensate, as defined in
Subsection (3), or any mixture of them.
(b) "Oil" does not include any gaseous or liquid substance processed from coal, oil shale, or
tar sands.
(13) (a) "Oil and gas proceeds" means any payment that:
(i) derives from oil and gas production from any well located in the state;
(ii) is expressed as a right to a specified interest in the:
(A) cash proceeds received from the sale of the oil and gas; or
(B) the cash value of the oil and gas; and
(iii) is subject to any tax withheld from the payment pursuant to law.
(b) "Oil and gas proceeds" includes a royalty interest, overriding royalty interest, production
payment interest, or working interest.
(c) "Oil and gas proceeds" does not include a net profits interest or other interest the extent of
which cannot be determined with reference to a specified share of:
(i) the cash proceeds received from the sale of the oil and gas; or
(ii) the cash value of the oil and gas.
(14) (a) "Other gas" means nonhydrocarbon gases that:
(i) occur naturally in the gaseous phase in the reservoir; or
(ii) are injected into the reservoir in connection with pressure maintenance, gas cycling, or
other secondary or enhanced recovery projects.
(b) "Other gas" includes hydrogen sulfide, carbon dioxide, helium, and nitrogen.
(15) "Owner" means the person who has the right:
(a) to drill into and produce from a reservoir; and
(b) appropriate the oil and gas produced for himself or for himself and others.
(16) "Operator" means the person who has been designated by the owners or the board to
operate a well or unit.
(17) "Payor" means the person who undertakes to distribute oil and gas proceeds to the
persons entitled to them, whether as the first purchaser of that production, as operator of the well
from which the production was obtained, or as lessee under the lease on which royalty is due.
(18) "Pool" means an underground reservoir containing a common accumulation of oil or gas
or both. Each zone of a general structure that is completely separated from any other zone in the
structure is a separate pool. "Common source of supply" and "reservoir" are synonymous with
"pool."
(19) "Pooling" means the bringing together of separately owned interests for the common
development and operation of a drilling unit.
(20) "Producer" means the owner or operator of a well capable of producing oil and gas.
(21) "Product" means any commodity made from oil and gas.

(22) "Waste" means:
(a) the inefficient, excessive, or improper use or the unnecessary dissipation of oil or gas or
reservoir energy;
(b) the inefficient storing of oil or gas;
(c) the locating, drilling, equipping, operating, or producing of any oil or gas well in a manner
that causes:
(i) a reduction in the quantity of oil or gas ultimately recoverable from a reservoir under
prudent and economical operations;
(ii) unnecessary wells to be drilled; or
(iii) the loss or destruction of oil or gas either at the surface or subsurface; or
(d) the production of oil or gas in excess of:
(i) transportation or storage facilities; or
(ii) the amount reasonably required to be produced as a result of the proper drilling,
completing, testing, or operating of a well or otherwise utilized on the lease from which it is
produced.
40-6-3. Waste prohibited.
The waste of oil or gas is prohibited.

40-6-4. Board of Oil, Gas and Mining created - Functions - Appointment of members Terms - Chair - Quorum - Expenses.
(1) There is created within the Department of Natural Resources the Board of Oil Gas and
Mining. The board shall be the policy making body for the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining.
(2) The board shall consist of seven members appointed by the governor, with the advice and
consent of the senate. No more than four members shall be from the same political party. The
members shall have the following qualifications:
(a) two members knowledgeable in mining matters;
(b) two members knowledgeable in oil and gas matters;
(c) one member knowledgeable in ecological and environmental matters;
(d) one member who is a private land owner, owns a mineral or royalty interest and is
knowledgeable in those interests; and
(e) one member who is knowledgeable in geological matters.
(3) (a) Except as required by Subsection (b), as terms of current board members expire, the
governor shall appoint each new member or reappointed member to a four-year term.
(b) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection (a), the governor shall, at the time of
appointment or reappointment, adjust the length of terms to ensure that the terms of board
members are staggered so that approximately half of the board is appointed every two years.
(4) (a) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any reason, the replacement shall be
appointed for the unexpired term by the governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(b) The person appointed shall have the same qualifications as his predecessor.
(5) The board shall appoint its chair from the membership. Four members of the board shall
constitute a quorum for the transaction of business and the holding of hearings.
(6) (a) (i) Members who are not government employees shall receive no compensation or
benefits for their services, but may receive per diem and expenses incurred in the performance of
•u~ ™* m Wo nffi™i duties at the rates established by the Division of Finance under Sections

(ii) Members may decline to receive per diem and expenses for their service.
(b) (i) State government officer and employee members who do not receive salary, per diem,
or expenses from their agency for their service may receive per diem and expenses incurred in the
performance of their official duties from the board at the rates established by the Division of
Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107.
(ii) State government officer and employee members may decline to receive per diem and
expenses for their service.
40-6-5, Jurisdiction of board - Rules.
(1) The board has jurisdiction over all persons and property necessary to enforce this chapter.
The board shall enact rules in accordance with the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(2) The board shall adopt rules and make orders as necessary to administer the following
provisions:
(a) Ownership of all facilities for the production, storage, treatment, transportation, refining,
or processing of oil and gas shall be identified.
(b) Well logs, directional surveys, and reports on well location, drilling, and production shall
be made and filed with the division. Logs of wells marked "confidential" shall be kept confidential
for one year after the date on which the log is required to be filed, unless the operator gives
written permission to release the log at an earlier date. Production reports shall be:
(i) filed monthly;
(ii) accurate; and
(iii) in a form that reasonably serves the needs of state agencies and private fee owners.
(c) Monthly reports from gas processing plants shall be filed with the division.
(d) Wells shall be drilled, cased, operated, and plugged in such manner as to prevent:
(i) the escape of oil, gas, or water out of the reservoir in which they are found into another
formation;
(ii) the detrimental intrusion of water into an oil or gas reservoir;
(iii) the pollution of fresh water supplies by oil, gas, or salt water;
(iv) blowouts;
(v) cavings;
(vi) seepages; and
(vii) fires.
(e) The drilling of wells shall not commence without an adequate and approved supply of
water as required by Title 73, Chapter 3. This provision is not intended to impose any additional
legal requirements, but to assure that existing legal requirements concerning the use of water have
been met prior to the commencement of drilling.
(f) The operator shall furnish a reasonable performance bond or other good and sufficient
surety, conditioned for the performance of the duty to:
(i) plug each dry or abandoned well;
(ii) repair each well causing waste or pollution; and
(iii) maintain and restore the well site.
(g) Production from wells shall be separated into oil and gas and measured by means and upon
standards that will be prescribed by the board and will reflect current industry standards.
(h) Crude oil obtained from any reserve pit, disposal pond or pit, or similar facility, and any
accumulation of nonmerchantable waste crude oil shall be treated and processed, as prescribed by
the board.
(i) Any person who produces, sells, purchases, acquires, stores, transports, refines, or
processes oil or gas or injects fluids for cycling, pressure maintenance, secondary or enhanced

for a period of at least six years. The records shall be available for examination by the board or its
agents at any reasonable time. Rules enacted to administer this subsection shall be consistent with
applicable federal requirements.
(j) Any person with an interest in a lease shall be notified when all or part of that interest in the
lease is sold or transferred.
(3) The board has the authority to regulate:
(a) all operations for and related to the production of oil or gas including:
(i) drilling, testing, equipping, completing, operating, producing, and plugging of wells; and
(ii) reclamation of sites;
(b) the spacing and location of wells;
(c) operations to increase ultimate recovery, such as:
(i) cycling of gas;
(ii) the maintenance of pressure; and
(iii) the introduction of gas, water, or other substances into a reservoir;
(d) the disposal of salt water and oil-field wastes;
(e) the underground and surface storage of oil, gas, or products; and
(f) the flaring of gas from an oil well.
(4) For the purposes of administering this chapter, the board may designate:
(a) wells as:
(i) oil wells; or
(ii) gas wells; and
(b) pools as:
(i) oil pools; or
(ii) gas pools.
(5) The board has exclusive jurisdiction over:
(a) class II injection wells, as defined by the federal Environmental Protection Agency or any
successor agency; and
(b) pits and ponds in relation to these injection wells.
(6) The board has jurisdiction:
(a) to hear any questions regarding multiple mineral development conflicts with oil and gas
operations if there:
(i) is potential injury to other mineral deposits on the same lands; or
(ii) are simultaneous or concurrent operations conducted by other mineral owners or lessees
affecting the same lands; and
(b) to enter its order or rule with respect to those questions.
(7) The board has enforcement powers with respect to operators of minerals other than oil
and gas as are set forth in Section 40-6-11, for the sole purpose of enforcing multiple mineral
development issues.

40-6-6, Drilling units - Establishment by board - Modifications - Prohibitions.
(1) The board may order the establishment of drilling units for any pool.
(2) Within each drilling unit, only one well may be drilled for production from the common
source of supply, except as provided in Subsection (6).
(3) A drilling unit may not be smaller than the maximum area that can be efficiently and
economically drained by one well.
(4) (a) Each drilling unit within a pool shall be of uniform size and shape, unless the board
finds that it must make an exception due to geologic, geographic, or other factors.
(b) If the board finds it necessary to divide a pool into zones and establish drilling units for
each zone, drilling units may differ in size and shape for each zone.
(5) An order of the board that establishes drilling units for a pool shall:
(a) be made upon terms and conditions that are just and reasonable;
(b) include all lands determined by the board to overlay the pool;
(c) specify the acreage and shape of each drilling unit as determined by the board; and
(d) specify the location of the well in terms of distance from drilling unit boundaries and other
wells.
(6) The board may modify an order that establishes drilling units for a pool to provide for:
(a) an exception to the authorized location of a well;
(b) the inclusion of additional areas which the board determines overlays the pool;
(c) the increase or decrease of the size of drilling units; or
(d) the drilling of additional wells within drilling units.
(7) (a) After an order establishing drilling units has been entered by the board, the drilling of
any well into the pool at a location other than that authorized by the order is prohibited.
(b) The operation of any well drilled in violation of an order fixing drilling units is prohibited.

40-6-6.5- Pooling of interests for the development and operation of a drilling unit Board may order pooling of interests - Payment of costs and royalty interests - Monthly
accounting.
(1) Two or more owners within a drilling unit may bring together their interests for the
development and operation of the drilling unit.
(2) (a) In the absence of a written agreement for pooling, the board may enter an order
pooling all interests in the drilling unit for the development and operation of the drilling unit.
(b) The order shall be made upon terms and conditions that are just and reasonable.
(c) The board may adopt terms appearing in an operating agreement:
(i) for the drilling unit that is in effect between the consenting owners;
(ii) submitted by any party to the proceeding; or
(iii) submitted by its own motion.

(3) (a) Operations incident to the drilling of a well upon any portion of a drilling unit covered
by a pooling order shall be deemed for all purposes to be the conduct of the operations upon each
separately owned tract in the drilling unit by the several owners.
(b) The portion of the production allocated or applicable to a separately owned tract included
in a drilling unit covered by a pooling order shall, when produced, be deemed for all purposes to
have been produced from that tract by a well drilled on it.
(4) (a) (i) Each pooling order shall provide for the payment of just and reasonable costs
incurred in the drilling and operating of the drilling unit including, but not limited to:
(A) the costs of drilling, completing, equipping, producing, gathering, transporting,
processing, marketing, and storage facilities;
(B) reasonable charges for the administration and supervision of operations; and
(C) other costs customarily incurred in the industry.
(ii) An owner is not liable under a pooling order for costs or losses resulting from the gross
negligence or willful misconduct of the operator.
(b) Each pooling order shall provide for reimbursement to the consenting owners for any
nonconsenting owner's share of the costs out of production from the drilling unit attributable to
his tract.
(c) Each pooling order shall provide that each consenting owner shall own and be entitled to
receive, subject to royalty or similar obligations:
(i) the share of the production of the well applicable to his interest in the drilling unit; and
(ii) unless he has agreed otherwise, his proportionate part of the nonconsenting owner's share
of the production until costs are recovered as provided in Subsection (d).
(d) (i) Each pooling order shall provide that each nonconsenting owner shall be entitled to
receive, subject to royalty or similar obligations, the share of the production of the well applicable
to his interest in the drilling unit after the consenting owners have recovered from the
nonconsenting owner's share of production the following amounts less any cash contributions
made by the nonconsenting owner:
(A) 100% of the nonconsenting owner's share of the cost of surface equipment beyond the
wellhead connections, including stock tanks, separators, treaters, pumping equipment, and piping;
(B) 100% of the nonconsenting owner's share of the estimated cost to plug and abandon the
well as determined by the board;
(C) 100% of the nonconsenting owner's share of the cost of operation of the well commencing
with first production and continuing until the consenting owners have recovered all costs; and
(D) an amount to be determined by the board but not less than 150% nor greater than 300%
of the nonconsenting owner's share of the costs of staking the location, wellsite preparation,
rights-of-way, rigging up, drilling, reworking, recompleting, deepening or plugging back, testing,
and completing, and the cost of equipment in the well to and including the wellhead connections.
(ii) The nonconsenting owner's share of the costs specified in Subsection (i) is that interest
which would have been chargeable to the nonconsenting owner had he initially agreed to pay his
share of the costs of the well from commencement of the operation.
(iii) A reasonable interest charge may be included if the board finds it appropriate.
(e) If there is any dispute about costs, the board shall determine the proper costs.
(5) If a nonconsenting owner's tract in the drilling unit is subject to a lease or other contract
for the development of oil and gas, the pooling order shall provide that the consenting owners

shall pay any royalty interest or other interest in the tract not subject to the deduction of the costs
of production from the production attributable to that tract.
(6) (a) If a nonconsenting owner's tract in the drilling unit is not subject to a lease or other
contract for the development of oil and gas, the pooling order shall provide that the
nonconsenting owner shall receive as a royalty the average landowner's royalty attributable to
each tract within the drilling unit.
(b) The royalty shall be:
(i) determined prior to the commencement of drilling; and
(ii) paid from production attributable to each tract until the consenting owners have recovered
the costs specified in Subsection (4)(d).
(7) The operator of a well under a pooling order in which there are nonconsenting owners
shall furnish the nonconsenting owners with monthly statements specifying:
(a) costs incurred;
(b) the quantity of oil or gas*produced; and
(c) the amount of oil and gas proceeds realized from the sale of the production during the
preceding month.
(8) Each pooling order shall provide that when the consenting owners recover from a
nonconsenting owner's relinquished interest the amounts provided for in Subsection (4)(d):
(a) the relinquished interest of the nonconsenting owner shall automatically revert to him;
(b) the nonconsenting owner shall from that time:
(i) own the same interest in the well and the production from it; and
(ii) be liable for the further costs of the operation as if he had participated in the initial drilling
and operation; and
(c) costs are payable out of production unless otherwise agreed between the nonconsenting
owner and the operator.
(9) Each pooling order shall provide that in any circumstance where the nonconsenting owner
has relinquished his share of production to consenting owners or at any time fails to take his share
of production in-kind when he is entitled to do so, the nonconsenting owner is entitled to:
(a) an accounting of the oil and gas proceeds applicable to his relinquished share of
production; and
(b) payment of the oil and gas proceeds applicable to that share of production not taken
in-kind, net of costs.
40-6-7. Agreements for repressuring or pressure maintenance or cycling or recycling
operations - Plan for development and operation of pool or field.
(1) An agreement for repressuring or pressure maintenance operations, cycling or recycling
operations, including the extraction and separation of liquid hydrocarbons from natural gas, or for
carrying on any other methods of unit or cooperative development or operation of a field or pool
or a part of either, is authorized and may be performed, and shall not be held or construed to
violate any statutes relating to trusts, monopolies, or contracts and combinations in restraint of
trade, if the agreement is approved by the board as being in the public interest and promotes
conservation, increases ultimate recovery and prevents waste of oil or gas provided the agreement
protects the correlative rights of each owner or producer.
(2) A plan for the development and operation of a pool or field shall be presented to the
board and may be approved after notice and hearing.

40-6-8. Field or pool units - Procedure for establishment - Operation.
(1) The board may hold a hearing to consider the need for the operation as a unit of one or
more pools or parts of them in a field.
(2) The board shall make an order providing for the unit operation of a pool or part of it, if
the board finds that:
(a) Such operation is reasonably necessary for the purposes of this chapter; and
(b) The value of the estimated additional recovery of oil or gas substantially exceeds the
estimated additional cost incident to conducting such operations.
(3) The order shall prescribe a plan for unit operations that shall include:
(a) a description of the lands and of the pool or pools or parts of them to be so operated,
termed the unit area;
(b) a statement of the nature of the operations contemplated;
(c) an allocation to the separately owned tracts in the unit area of all the oil and gas that is
produced from the unit area and is saved, being the production that is not used in the conduct of
operations on the unit area or not unavoidably lost. The allocation shall be in accord with the
agreement, if any, of the interested parties. If there is no such agreement, the board shall
determine the relative value, from evidence introduced at the hearing of the separately owned
tracts in the unit area, exclusive of physical equipment, for development of oil and gas by unit
operations, and the production allocated to each tract shall be the proportion that the relative
value of each tract so determined bears to the relative value of all tracts in the unit area;
(d) a provision for adjustment among the owners of the unit area (not including royalty
owners) of their respective investment in wells, tanks, pumps, machinery, materials, equipment,
and other things and services of value attributable to the unit operations. The amount to be
charged unit operations for any such item shall be determined by the owners of the unit area (not
including royalty owners); but if the owners of the unit area are unable to agree upon the amount
or correctness, the board shall determine them. The net amount charged against the owner of an
interest in a separately owned tract shall be considered expense of unit operation chargeable
against his interest in the tract. The adjustments provided for may be treated separately and
handled by agreements separate from the unitization agreement;
(e) a provision providing how the costs of unit operations, including capital investments, shall
be determined and charged to the separately owned tracts and how these costs shall be paid,
including a provision providing a procedure for the unit production allocated to an owner who
does not pay the share of the cost of unit operations charged to such owner, or the interest of
such owner, to be sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of such costs. The operator of the
unit shall have a first and prior lien for costs incurred pursuant to the plan of unitization upon each
owner's oil and gas rights and his share of unitized production to secure the payment of such
owner's proportionate part of the cost of developing and operating the unit area. This lien may be
established and enforced in the same manner as provided by Sections 38-1-8 to 38-1-26 inclusive.
For such purposes any nonconsenting owner shall be deemed to have contracted with the unit
operator for his proportionate part of the cost of developing and operating the unit area. A
transfer or conversion of any owner's interest or any portion of it, however accomplished, after
the effective date of the order creating the unit, shall not relieve the transferred interest of the
operator's lien on said interest for the cost and expense of unit operations;
(f) a provision, if necessary, for carrying or otherwise financing any owner who elects to be
carried or otherwise financed, allowing a reasonable interest charge for such service payable out
of such owner's share of the production;

(g) a provision for the supervision and conduct of the unit operations, in respect to which each
owner shall have a percentage vote corresponding to the percentage of the costs of unit
operations chargeable against the interest of the owner;
(h) the time when the unit operations shall commence, and the manner in which, and the
circumstances under which, the unit operations shall terminate;
(i) such additional provisions that are found to be appropriate for carrying on the unit
operations, and for the protection of correlative rights; and
(j) the designation of a unit operator.
(4) No order of the board providing for unit operations of a pool or pools shall become
effective unless and until the plan for unit operations prescribed by the division has been approved
in writing by those owners who, under the board's order, will be required to pay 70% of the costs
of the unit operation, and also by the owners of 70% of the production or proceeds that will be
credited to interests which are free of cost, such as royalties, overriding royalties, and production
payments, and the board has made a finding, either in the order providing for unit operations or in
a supplemental order, that the plan for unit operations has been so approved. If the persons
owning required percentage of interest in that unit area do not approve the plan for unit
operations within a period of six months from the date on which the order providing for unit
operations is made, the order shall be ineffective and shall be revoked by the board unless for
good cause shown the board extends this time.
(5) An order providing for unit operations may be amended by an order made by the board in
the same manner and subject to the same conditions as an original order providing for unit
operations, provided:
(a) If such an amendment affects only the rights and interests of the owners, the approval of
the amendment by the owners of royalty, overriding royalty, production payments and other such
interests which are free of costs shall not be required.
(b) No such order of amendment shall change the percentage for the allocation of oil and gas
as established for any separately owned tract by the original order, or change the percentage for
allocation of cost as established for any separately owned tract by the original order.
(6) The board, by an order, may provide for the unit operation of a pool or pools or parts
thereof that embrace a unit area established by a previous order of the division. The order, in
providing for the allocation of unit production, shall first treat the unit area previously established
as a single tract, and the portion of the unit production allocated shall then be allocated among the
separately owned tracts included in the previously established unit area in the same proportions of
those specified in the previous order.
(7) An order may provide for unit operations on less than the whole of a pool where the unit
area is of such size and shape as may be reasonably required for that purpose, and the conduct
will have no adverse effect upon other portions of the pool.
(8) All operations, including, but not limited to, the commencement, drilling, or operation of
a well upon any portion of the unit area shall be deemed for all purposes the conduct of such
operations upon each separately owned tract in the unit area by the several owners. The portions
of the unit production allocated to a separately owned tract in a unit area shall, when produced,
be deemed, for all purposes, to have been actually produced from such tract by a well drilled.
Operations conducted pursuant to an order of the board providing for unit operations shall
constitute a fulfillment of all the express or implied obligations for each lease or contract covering
lands in the unit area to the extent that compliance with such obligations cannot be had because of
the order of the board.

(9) The portion of the unit production allocated to any tract, and the proceeds from the sale,
shall be the property and income of the several owners, subject to the rights of royalty owners, to
whom, or to whose credit, they are allocated or payable under the order providing for unit
operations.
(10) No division order or other contract relating to the sale or purchase of production from a
separately owned tract shall be terminated by the order providing for unit operations but shall
remain in force and apply to oil and gas allocated to such tract until terminated in accordance with
the provisions thereof.
(11) Except to the extent that the parties affected agree and as provided in (e) of Subsection
(3) of this section, no order providing for unit operations shall be construed to result in a transfer
of all or any part of the title of any person to the oil and gas rights in any tract in the unit area. All
property, whether real or personal, that may be acquired in the conduct of unit operations
hereunder shall be acquired for the account of the owners within the unit area and shall be the
property of the owners in the proportion that the expenses of unit operations are charged, unless
otherwise provided in the plan of unit operation.
(12) This section shall apply only to field or pool units and shall not apply to the unitization
of interests within a drilling unit as may be authorized and governed under the provisions of
Section 40-6-6.

40-6-9- Proceeds from sale of production - Payment of proceeds - Requirements Proceeding on petition to determine cause of nonpayment - Remedies - Penalties.
(1) (a) The oil and gas proceeds derived from the sale of production from any well producing
oil or gas in the state shall be paid to any person legally entitled to the payment of the proceeds
not later than 180 days after the first day of the month following the date of the first sale and
thereafter not later than 30 days after the end of the calendar month within which payment is
received by the payor for production, unless other periods or arrangements are provided for in a
valid contract with the person entitled to the proceeds.
(b) The payment shall be made directly to the person entitled to the payment by the payor.
(c) The payment is considered to have been made upon deposit in the United States mail.
(2) Payments shall be remitted to any person entitled to oil and gas proceeds annually for the
aggregate of up to 12 months accumulation of proceeds, if the total amount owed is $100 or less.
(3) (a) Any delay in determining whether a person is legally entitled to an interest in the oil
and gas proceeds does not affect payments to other persons entitled to payment.
(b) (i) If accrued payments cannot be made within the time limits specified in Subsection (1)
or (2), the payor shall deposit all oil and gas proceeds credited to the eventual oil and gas
proceeds owner to an escrow account in a federally insured bank or savings and loan institution
using a standard escrow document form.
(ii) The deposit shall earn interest at the highest rate being offered by that institution for the
amount and term of similar demand deposits.
(iii) The escrow agent may commingle money received into escrow from any one lessee or
operator, purchaser, or other person legally responsible for payment.
(iv) Payment of principal and accrued interest from the escrow account shall be made by the
escrow agent to the person legally entitled to them within 30 days from the date of receipt by the
escrow agent of final legal determination of entitlement to the payment.
(v) Aoolicable escrow fees ^hall lv» A^A^nt^A fr^m *u<* ~^~~™*«

(4) Any person entitled to oil and gas proceeds may file a petition with the board to conduct a
hearing to determine why the proceeds have not been paid.
(5) Upon receipt of the petition, the board shall set the matter for investigation and
negotiation by the division within 60 days.
(6) (a) If the matter cannot be resolved by negotiation as of that date, the board may set a
hearing within 30 days.
(b) If the board does not set a hearing, any information gathered during the investigation and
negotiation shall be given to the petitioner who may then seek a remedy in a court of competent
jurisdiction.
(7) (a) If, after a hearing, the board finds the proceeds have not been deposited in an interest
bearing escrow account in accordance with Subsection (3), the board may order that:
(i) a complete accounting be made; and
(ii) the proceeds be subject to an interest rate of 1 1/2% per month, as a substitute for an
escrow account interest rate, accruing from the date the payment should have been suspended in
accordance with Subsection (3).^
(b) If, after a hearing, the board finds the delay of payment is without reasonable justification,
the board may:
(i) if the proceeds have been deposited in an interest bearing escrow account in accordance
with Subsection (3):
(A) order a complete accounting;
(B) require the proceeds and accruing interest to remain in the escrow account; and
(C) assess a penalty of up to 25% of the total proceeds and interest in the escrow account; or
(ii) if the proceeds have not been deposited in an interest bearing escrow account in
accordance with Subsection (3), assess a penalty of up to 25% of the total proceeds and interest
as determined under Subsection (a).
(c) (i) Upon finding that the delay of payment is without reasonable justification, the board
shall set a date not later than 90 days from the hearing for final distribution of the total sum.
(ii) If payment is not made by the required date, the total proceeds, interest, and any penalty
as provided in Subsection (b) shall be subject to interest at a rate of 1 1/2% per month until paid.
(d) If, after a hearing, the board finds the delay of payment is with reasonable justification and
the proceeds have been deposited in an interest bearing escrow account in accordance with
Subsection (3), the payor may not be required to make an accounting or payment of appropriately
suspended proceeds until the condition which justified suspension has been satisfied.
(8) The circumstances under which the board may find the suspension of payment of
proceeds is made with reasonable justification, such that the penalty provisions of Subsections
(7)(b) and (7)(c)(ii) do not apply, include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) the payor:
(i) fails to make the payment in good faith reliance upon a title opinion by a licensed Utah
attorney objecting to the lack of good and marketable title of record of the person claiming
entitlement to payment; and
(ii) furnishes a copy of the relevant portions of the opinion to the person for necessary
curative action;
(b) the payor receives information which:
(i) in the payor's good faith judgment, brings into question the entitlement of the person
claiming the right to the payment to receive that payment;
(ii) has rendered the title unmarketable; or
(iii) may expose the payor to the risk of liability to third parties if the payment is made;

(c) the total amount of oil and gas proceeds in possession of the payor owed to the person
making claim to payment is less than $100 at the end of any month; or
(d) the person entitled to payment has failed or refused to execute a division or transfer order
acknowledging the proper interest to which the person claims to be entitled and setting forth the
mailing address to which payment may be directed, provided the division or transfer order does
not alter or amend the terms of the lease.
(9) If the circumstances described in Subsection (8)(a) or (b) arise, the payor may:
(a) suspend and escrow the payments in accordance with Subsection (3); or
(b) at the request and expense of the person claiming entitlement to the payment, make the
payment into court on an interpleader action to resolve the claim and avoid UabiUty under this
chapter.

40-6-9.1. Payment information to royalty owners.
(1) When payment is made to an owner of a royalty interest for the sale of oil or gas
produced from that royalty interest pursuant to the requirements of Section 40-6-9, the foUowing
information shaU be included on the payor's check stub or on an attachment to the form of
payment:
(a) the lease, property, or weU name, and any lease, property, or weU identification number
from which production is attributed;
(b) the month and year of the sales included in the payment;
(c) the total volume of oil or gas sold, as measured by the means and upon the standards
prescribed by the board pursuant to Subsection 40-6-5(2)(g);
(d) the average price per unit of oil or gas sold;
(e) the total amount of state severance, ad valorem, and other production taxes;
(f) a Ust of any other deductions or adjustments;
(g) the net value of total sales after taxes are deducted;
(h) the royalty owner's interest, expressed as a decimal number, in sales from the lease,
property, or weU;
(i) the royalty owner's share of the total value of sales prior to any deductions;
(j) the royalty owner's proportionate share of the sales value less the royalty owner's
proportionate share of the deductions, as appUcable; and
(k) an address at which additional information pertaining to the royalty owner's interest in
production may be obtained and questions may be answered.
(2) (a) A royalty owner who fails to receive the information required by this section may
notify the board by certified mail of the problem and request that the division conduct an
investigation.
(b) The division shaU conduct the investigation and report to the board concerning:
(i) whether the matter has been resolved; or
(u) whether further action is necessary and its recommendations for resolution of the matter.
(c) The board may take any action it considers necessary to resolve the matter pursuant to the
provisions of this chapter.
(3) A royalty owner damaged by a violation of this section may proceed as provided in
Subsection 40-6-11(7).

40-6-9.5. Permits for crude oil production - Application - Bond requirement - Closure of
facilities - Availability of records.
(1) The division may issue permits authorizing construction, operation, maintenance, and
cessation of treating facilities and operations covered by Subsection 40-6-5(2)(h) and to approve,
as part of that permit, post-cessation reclamation of the site.
(2) Each owner and operator of any facility described in Subsection 40-6-5(2)(h) or planning
to construct, operate, or maintain a facility described in Subsection 40-6-5(2)(h) shall submit to
the division an application stating in detail the location, type, and capacity of the facility
contemplated; the extent and location of area disturbed or to be disturbed including, but not
limited to, any pits, ponds, or lands, associated with the facility; a plan for reclamation of the site;
and other materials required fey the division. All existing facilities described in Subsection
40-6-5(2)(h) shall submit plans by July 28, 1985. Application for all planned facilities must be
approved and a permit issued before any ground clearing or construction may occur.
(3) As a condition for approval of any permit, the owner and operator shall post a bond in an
amount determined by the division to cover reclamation costs for the site. Approval of any permit
is also conditioned upon compliance with all laws, rules, and orders of the board. Failure to post
the bond is considered sufficient grounds to deny a permit.
(4) The board may order the closure of any facility described in Subsection 40-6-5(2)(h) if an
application is not forthcoming in the time allowed in Subsection (2), a bond is not posted, a
violation of the rules and regulations of other state or federal agencies exists, or for other material
and substantial cause.
(5) The owner and operator are subject to all applicable state, federal, and local rules and
regulations.
(6) The records required to be kept by Subsection 40-6-5(2)(i) shall be available for
inspection and audit by the board or its agents during reasonable working hours.
40-6-10. Procedures - Adjudicative proceedings - Emergency orders - Hearing
examiners.
(1) (a) The Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining and the Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining shall
comply with the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in their adjudicative
proceedings.
(b) The board shall enact rules governing its practice and procedure that are not inconsistent
with Title 63, Chapter 46b.
(2) When an emergency requiring immediate action is found by the division director or any
board member to exist, he may issue an emergency order according to the requirements and
procedures of Title 63, Chapter 46b.
(3) Any notice required by this chapter, except as otherwise provided, shall be given at the
election of the board either by personal service or by one publication in a daily newspaper of
general circulation in the city of Salt Lake and county of Salt Lake, Utah, and in all newspapers of
general circulation published in the county where the land is affected, or some part of the land is
situated.
(4) (a) Any order made by the board is effective on issuance,
(b) All rules and orders issued by the board shall be:
(i) in writing;

(iv) public records open for inspection at all times during reasonable office hours,
(c) A copy of any rule, finding of fact, or order, certified by the board or by the division
director, shall be received in evidence in all courts of this state with the same effect as the original.
(5) The board may act upon its own motion or upon the petition of any interested person.
(6) (a) The board may appoint a hearing examiner to take evidence and to recommend
findings of fact and conclusions of law to the board.
(b) Any member of the board, division staff, or any other person designated by the board may
serve as a hearing examiner.
(c) The board may enter an order based on the recommendations of the examiner.

40-6-11. Power to summon witnesses, administer oaths and require production of
records - Enforcement - Penalties for violation of chapter or rules - Illegal oil or gas - Civil
liability.
(1) The board may summon witnesses, administer oaths, and require the production of
records, books, and documents for examination at any hearing or investigation conducted by it.
(2) (a) If any person fails or refuses to comply with a subpoena issued by the board, or fails
or refuses to testify about any matter, the board may apply to any district court in the state for an
order compelling that person to comply with the subpoena, and to attend before the board and
produce the subpoenaed records, books, and documents for examination, and to give his
testimony.
(b) The court may punish the person for contempt as if he disobeyed a subpoena issued by the
court, or if he refused to testify in a court.
(3) (a) Whenever it appears that any person is violating any provision of this chapter or any
rule or order made under the authority of this chapter, the board may issue an order requiring
compliance within a period not to exceed 30 days.
(b) The board may bring suit in the name of the state against any person violating this chapter,
or rules or orders made under the authority of this chapter if:
(i) the violation continues after expiration of the time period granted in Subsection (3)(a);
(ii) the violation presents an immediate threat to public health, safety, or welfare; or
(iii) the violation would cause waste.
(4) (a) If the board determines, after an adjudicative proceeding, that any person has violated
any provision of this chapter, or any permit, rule, or order made under the provisions of this
chapter, that person is subject, in a civil proceeding, to a penalty not exceeding $5,000 per day for
each day of violation.
(b) If the board determines that the violation is willful, that person may be fined not more than
$10,000 for each day of violation.
(5) If ordered to do so by the board, the director of the division may order the immediate
closure or shutdown of any well that is operating in violation of the provisions of this chapter, if

the closure or shutdown will not cause waste or is necessary because of an immediate threat to
public health, safety, or welfare.
(6) (a) No person may sell, purchase, acquire, transport, refine, process, or handle illegal oil,
gas, or product, if the person knows or has reason to know that the oil, gas, or product is illegal
(b) The court in the district where the illegal oil, gas, or product is found, shall, after notice
and hearing in an action brought by the board, order the product to be seized and sold, and the
proceeds returned or held for the legal owner.
(7) (a) Nothing in this chapter, and no suit by or against the board, and no violation charged
or asserted against any person under any provisions of this chapter, or any rule or order issued
under the authority of this chapter, shall impair, abridge, or delay any cause of action for damages
that any person may have or assert against any person violating any provision of this chapter, or
any rule or order issued under the authority of this chapter.
(b) Any person damaged by any violation may sue for and recover whatever damages that he
otherwise may be entitled to receive.

40-6-12. Evasion of chapter or rules - Penalties - Limitation of actions,
(1) (a) A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if, for the purpose of evading this chapter
or any rule or order of the board, he is convicted of any of the following:
(i) making or causing to be made any false entry in any report, record, account, or
memorandum required by this chapter or by any rule or order;
(ii) omitting or causing to be omitted from any report, record, account, or memorandum, full,
true, and correct entries as required by this chapter or by any rule or order; or
(iii) removing from this state or destroying, mutilating, altering, or falsifying any record,
account, or memorandum.
(b) Upon conviction, that person is subject to a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment
for a term not exceeding six months, or to both fine and imprisonment.
(2) No suit, action, or other proceeding based upon a violation of this chapter or any rule or
order of the board may be commenced or maintained unless it is commenced within one year from
the date of the alleged violation.

40-6-13. Restrictions of production not authorized.
This act shall never be construed to require, permit or authorize the board or any court to
make, enter or enforce any order, rule, regulation, or judgment requiring restriction of production
of any pool or of any well (except a well drilled in violation of Section 40-6-6 hereof) to an
amount less than the well or pool can produce unless such restriction is necessary to prevent
waste and protect correlative rights, or the operation of a well without sufficient oil or gas
production to cover current operating costs and provide a reasonable return, without regard to
original drilling costs.

40-6-14. Fee on oil and gas at well - Collection - Penalty and interest on delinquencies Payment when product taken in-kind - Interests exempt.
(1) There is levied a fee of .002 of the value at the well of oil and gas:
(a) produced and saved;
(b) sold; or
(c) transported from the premises in Utah where the oil or gas is produced.
(2) (a) The State Tax Commission shall administer the collection of the fee, including any
penalties and interest.
(b) The monies collected shall be deposited in the Oil and Gas Conservation Account created
in Section 40-6-14.5.
(c) Time periods for the State Tax Commission to allow a refund or assess the fee shall be
determined in accordance with Section 59-5-114.
(3) (a) Each person having an ownership interest in oil or gas at the time of production shall
be liable for a proportionate sharevof the fee equivalent to his ownership interest.
(b) As used in this section "ownership interest" means any:
(i) working interest;
(ii) royalty interest;
(iii) interest in payments out of production; or
(iv) any other interest in the oil or gas, or in the proceeds of the oil or gas, subject to the fee.
(4) The operator, on behalf of himself and any person having an ownership interest in the oil
or gas, shall pay the assessed fee quarterly to the State Tax Commission on or before the 45th day
following the quarter in which the fee accrued.
(5) (a) Any fee not paid within the time specified shall:
(i) carry a penalty as provided in Section 59-1-401; and
(ii) bear interest at the rate and in the manner prescribed in Section 59-1-402.
(b) The fee, together with the interest, shall be a lien upon the oil or gas against which it is
levied. The operator shall deduct from any amounts due to the persons owning an interest in the
oil or gas, or in the proceeds at the time of production, a proportionate amount of the charge
before making payment to the persons.
(6) (a) When product is taken in-kind by an interest owner who is not the operator and the
operator cannot determine the value of the in-kind product, the operator shall:
(i) report 100% of the production;
(ii) deduct the product taken in-kind; and
(iii) pay the levy on the difference.
(b) The interest owner who takes the product in-kind shall file a report and pay the levy on his
share of production excluded from the operator's report.
(7) This section shall apply to any interest in oil or gas produced in the state except:
(a) any interest of the United States;
(b) any interest of the state or its political subdivisions in any oil or gas or in the proceeds;
(c) any interest of any Indian or Indian tribe in any oil or gas or in the proceeds produced from
land subject to the supervision of the United States; or
(d) oil or gas used in producing or drilling operations or for repressuring or recycling
purposes.

40-6-14.5. Oil and Gas Conservation Account created - Contents - Use of account
monies.
(1) There is created within the General Fund a restricted account known as the Oil and Gas
Conservation Account.
(2) The contents of the account shall consist of:
(a) revenues from the fee levied under Section 40-6-14, including any penalties or interest
charged for delinquent payments; and
(b) interest and earnings on account monies.
(3) Account monies shall be used to pay for the:
(a) administration of this chapter; and
(b) plugging and reclamation of abandoned oil or gas wells or bore, core, or exploratory holes
for which:
(i) there is no reclamation sufety; or
(ii) the forfeited surety is insufficient for plugging and reclamation.
(4) Priority in the use of the monies shall be given to paying for the administration of this
chapter.
(5) Appropriations for plugging and reclamation of abandoned oil or gas wells or bore, core,
or exploratory holes shall be nonlapsing.
(6) The balance of the Oil and Gas Conservation Account at the end of a fiscal year may not
exceed $750,000. Any excess monies shall be transferred to the General Fund.
(7) (a) As used in this Subsection (7), "excess fee revenue" means revenue collected in fiscal
year 1999-2000 from the fee levied under Section 40-6-14 that exceeds the fee revenue
appropriated to the Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining in fiscal year 1999-2000.
(b) If there is a General Fund surplus for fiscal year 1999-2000, the Division of Finance shall
transfer General Fund surplus monies to the Oil and Gas Conservation Account in an amount up
to the excess fee revenue.
(c) The transfer provided in Subsection (7)(b) shall be made after General Fund surplus
monies are transferred to the Budget Reserve Account pursuant to Section 63-38-2.5.

40-6-15. Division created - Functions - Director of division - Qualifications of program
administrators.
There is created within the Department of Natural Resources the Division of Oil, Gas and
Mining. The division shall implement the policies and orders of the board and perform all other
duties delegated by the board.
The director of the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining shall be appointed by the director of the
Department of Natural Resources with the concurrence of the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining. The
director shall be the executive and administrative head of the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining and
shall be a person experienced in administration and knowledgeable in the extraction of oil, gas and
minerals.
Within the division, the person administering the oil and gas program shall have the technical
background to eflSciently administer that program. The person administering the mining program
shall have the technical background to eflSciently administer that program.

40-6-16. Duties of division.
In addition to the duties assigned by the board, the division shall:
(1) develop and implement an inspection program that will include but not be limited to
production data, pre-driUing checks, and site security reviews;
(2) publish a monthly production report;
(3) publish a monthly gas processing plant report;
(4) review and evaluate, prior to a hearing, evidence submitted with the petition to be
presented to the board;
(5) require adequate assurance of approved water rights in accordance with rules and orders
enacted under Section 40-6-5; and
(6) notify the county executive of the county in which the drilling will take place in writing of
the issuance of a drilling permit.

40-6-17. Cooperative research and development projects.
The Board and the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining are authorized to enter into cooperative
agreements with the national, state or local governments, and with independent organizations and
t tutions for the purpose of carrying out research and development experiments involving
rgy resources to the extent that the project is funded or partially funded and approved by the
Legislature.

40-6-18. Lands subject to chapter.
This act shall apply to all lands in the State of Utah, lawfully subject to its poUce power and
shall apply to lands of the United States or the lands subject to the jurisdiction of the Umted
States.

Tab 2

R649-2-9. Refusal To Agree.
1. An owner shall be deemed to have refused to agree to bear his proportionate share of the
costs of the drilling and operation of a well under Section 40-6-6(6) if:
1.1. The operator of the proposed well has, in good faith, attempted to reach agreement with
such owner for the leasing of the owner's mineral interest or for that owner's voluntary
participation in the drilling of the well.
1.2. The owner and the operator have been unable to agree upon terms for the leasing of the
owner's interest or for the owner's participation in the drilling of the well.
2. If the operator of the proposed well shall fail to attempt, in good faith, to reach agreement
with the owner for the leasing of that owner's mineral interest or for voluntary participation by
that owner in the well prior to thefilingof a Request for Agency Action for involuntary pooling
of interests in the drilling unit under Section 40-6-6(6) then, upon written request and after notice
and hearing, the hearing on the Request for Agency Action for involuntary pooling may, at the
discretion of the board or its designated hearing examiner, be delayed for a period not to exceed
30 days, to allow for negotiations between the operator and the owner.
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SECRETARY, BOARD OF
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE REQUEST
FOR AGENCY ACTION OF
PATRICK HEGARTY FOR AN ORDER
POOLING ALL INTERESTS IN THE
ESTABLISHED SPACING UNITS FOR
THE PRODUCTION OF GAS
(INCLUDING COALBED METHANE)
FROM THE FERRON FORMATION
FROM THE NORTH HALF OF SECTION
5, TOWNSHIP 15 SOUTH, RANGE 10
EAST, SLB&M, CARBON COUNTY,
UTAH.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER

DOCKET NO. 2000-009
CAUSE NO. 243-5

This cause came before the Utah Board of Oil, Gas & Mining ("the Board") on
Wednesday, August 23, 2000, at 10:00 am in Salt Lake City, Utah. The following Board
members were present and participated in the hearing:
Dave D. Lauriski, Chairman
Elise L. Erler
J. James Peacock
Raymond Murray
Thomas Faddies recused himself and did not participate in this matter. Stephanie
Cartwright and W. Allan Mashburn were not present.
Attending and participating on behalf of the Division of Oil, Gas & Mining ("the
Division") was John Baza, Associate Director. The Division and Board were represented by
Thomas Mitchell, Assistant Attorney General, and Kurt E. Seel, Assistant Attorney General,
respectively.

Testifying on behalf of Petitioner Patrick Hegarty was Patrick Hegarty, Tom Mullins, and
Glen Papp. Patrick Hegarty was represented by H. Michael Keller, Esq. of Van Cott, Bagley,
Cornwall & MacCarthy. Landowners and other interest holders who were present and whose
interests were represented by Patrick Hegarty and his counsel included Terry Olsen and Rita
Beck.
Testifying on behalf of Respondents River Gas Corporation (RGC), Texaco Exploration
and Production ("TEXEP"), Dominion Reserves-Utah, Inc. (independently and collectively
"Respondents") were Richard L. Sutton, Michael J. Farrens, Joseph Stephenson, and Chuck
Snure. Respondents were represented by Frederick M. McDonald, Esq. of Pruitt, Gushee &
Bachtell.
The United States Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") was represented by Mr.
Henricks.
The Board, having received and considered the written comments and briefs, the
testimony of witnesses and the exhibits received into evidence at the hearing, and being fully
advised by the parties, and for good cause appearing, hereby makes the following Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In its spacing Order entered in Cause No. 243-3 effective January 26, 2000, the

Board established the following drilling and spacing units for the production of gas, including
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coalbed methane, from the Ferron formation from the captioned lands:
Unit No.

Lands

1

Lots 3 and 4, SftNWVi [NWl/4]
(containing 157.72 acres)

2

Lots 2 and 5-35, SW'/iNEtt [NEVq
(containing 158.12 acres)

In its spacing Order Cause No. 243-3 the Board expressly rejected Petitioner Hegarty's request
that the Order be retroactively effective to the dates of first production of the 5-94 and 5-266
wells as to each respective unit. The Board declared the Utah 5-94 well (the "5-94 well") as the
authorized well for Unit No. 1 and the Woolstenhulme 5-266 well (the "5-266 well") as the
authorized well for Unit No. 2. Both wells are operated by RGC as unit operator of the
Drunkards Wash Federal Exploratory Unit (the "DW Unit").
2.

The DW Unit was originally approved effective December 28, 1990, and is

administered by the United States Bureau of Land Management ("BLM"). The DW Unit, after
six expansions, now covers 90,695.25 acres in Carbon and Emery Counties. The governing Unit
Agreement has been ratified by over ninety (90%) percent of the mineral owners and their
lessees. The DW Unit covers oil and gas producible from all formations, including coalbed
methane producible from the Ferron formation.
3.

The subject lands are located within, but not committed to the DW Unit. Owners

of the uncommitted lands located within the DW Unit, include LaRue Layne, Terry T. Olsen &
Juretta L. Olsen, Trustees under Trust Agreement dated November 5, 1985, and Trustees as
named in that certain Warranty Deed dated September 25,1987, and recorded in Book 277,
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Page 268, Carbon County Records, Morris Orvill Alexander, individually and as Trustee as
named in that certain Warranty Deed dated September 25, 1987, and recorded in Book 277, Page
268, Carbon County Records, Rita Beck, Ten Layne, and Kelly Layne-Benning (independently
or collectively the "Petitioner's Landowner(s)"). All of Petitioner's Landowners are related by
blood or marriage. Petitioner's Landowners own 65.736531% of the minerals in Unit No. 1 and
16.28895% of the minerals in Unit No. 2.
4.

Carbon County owns 1.277511% of the minerals in Unit No. 2. As evidenced by

Warranty Deed recorded March 20, 1992 in Book 314, Page 639, Carbon County Records,
Carbon County conveyed this interest in Unit No. 2 to Michelle Lea in 1992. However, as
evidenced by Quit Claim Deed recorded November 15, 1999, in Book 445, Page 752, Ms. Lea
reconveyed the interest back to Carbon County in 1999. Between 1992 and 1999, Ms. Lea was
the apparent owner of record for her parcel.
5.

At one or more times between 1991 and 1995, and thereafter, Mr. Terry Olsen,

Ms. Larue Layne, and other relatives of Ms. LaRue Layne, expressed or implied to RGC that
LaRue Layne had authority to communicate with RGC on behalf of other family landowners in
regard to RGC's offers to lease their interests or join the DW Unit.
6.

Beginning in late 1990 Ms. LaRue Layne was invited by RGC, both verbally and

in writing, to join the DW Unit or to lease her and her family's mineral interests. In 1991,
Petitioner's Landowners were invited by RGC in writing to join the federal DW Unit but either
failed to respond or declined to accept. Subsequently, RGC sent certified letters dated July 20,
1995, offering Petitioner's Landowners to either lease or commit their interests to the DW Unit
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as working interest owners on the same terms as any other working interest owners in their
respective positions.
7.

The bonus and other general terms and conditions of the written offers presented

to Petitioner's Landowners by Respondent(s), to either lease their mineral interests or to join the
federal Drunkards Wash Unit, were reasonable and in good faith.
8.

RGC's written and verbal communications with LaRue Layne, and its

communications and attempted communications with Ms. LaRue Laynes' children and relatives,
were reasonable and in good faith.
9.

Petitioner's Landowner(s) either failed to accept, or failed to respond to, the

Respondent's July 20, 1995, offer to lease their interests or join the DW Unit. However, at no
time did Respondents offer Petitioner's Landowners the opportunity to participate
proportionately on an individual well basis for either well 5-94 or well 5-266. RGC relied in
good faith on the responses, and lack or responses, from LaRue Layne and other members of her
family.
10.

Beginning in 1990 and again in 1995, but prior to the drilling of unit well 5-94,

Petitioner's Landowners knew or reasonably should have known of the following: their
properties were located within the boundaries of a federal oil and gas unit; that oil and gas may
be present under their property; that third parties, including the operators of the DW Unit
believed some or all of the them had an ownership interest in the oil and gas under their property;
and that two unit wells were planned to be drilled on or near their properties.
11.

RGC, as DW Unit Operator, commenced the drilling of the 5-94 well on Lot 4
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(the NWI/4NW/4) of Section 5 on September 11, 1995, and completed it as a coalbed methane
well in the Ferron formation on November 7, 1995. Subsequent to 1995, Petitioner's
Landowners knew or reasonably should have known that unit well 5-94 was in fact drilled and
was later operating as a production well, and that they had, or potentially had, an ownership
interest in the methane gas being produced from that well. RGC, as DW Unit Operator,
commenced the drilling of the 5-266 well on the SWV^NEVi of Section 5 on November 12, 1998,
and completed it as a coalbed methane well in the Ferron formation on December 23, 1998.
Subsequent to completion of the well 5-266 in 1998, Petitioner's Landowners knew or
reasonably should have known that unit well 5-266 was operating as a production well, and that
they potentially had an ownership interest in the methane gas being produced from that well. The
locations of both wells were authorized by virtue of the Utah Division of Oil, Gas & Mining's
(the "Division's") approval of applications for permit to drill and the Board's Order entered in
Cause No. 243-2 on July 13, 1999. Both wells are located on leaseholds owned solely by
Respondents.
12.

At the time the 5-94 and 5-266 wells were drilled the subject lands were subject

only to the general well siting rule (Utah Admin. Code Rule R649-3-2), which was suspended by
virtue of the Board's Order entered July 13, 1999, in Cause No. 243-2. The first order entered by
the Board establishing spacing for coalbed methane produced from the Ferron formation in
Carbon County was entered in Cause No. 241-1 on January 2, 1998. The first order entered by
the Board establishing spacing for coalbed methane produced from the Ferron formation in areas
directly adjacent to the DW Unit (and in response to a Request for Agency Action filed by RGC)
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was entered October 13, 1998, in Cause No. 243-1. The captioned lands were not subject to any
spacing order until entry of the Board's order in Cause No. 243-3 effective January 26, 2000.
13.

On June 21, 1999, Hegarty leased the mineral interests of Petitioner's

Landowners. At that time he was aware the captioned lands were within the physical boundaries
of the DW Unit, and of the existence of the 5-94 and 5-266 wells and RGC's operation of them.
14.

Petitioner Patrick Hegarty's interests and rights in this matter are derived from the

landowners' mineral interests in the subject areas.
15.

At the time they were drilled, wells 5-94 and 5-266 were located near the edge of

the known coalbed methane gas field, and for purposes of imposing a risk penalty under the facts
of this matter, and for no other purpose, wells 5-94 and 5-266 constitute exploratory wells. At
the time wells 5-94 and 5-266 were drilled, Respondents incurred a moderate amount of risk that
these wells would not produce sufficient coalbed methane gas to become production wells.
16.

There is no unit, pooling, operating, or other similar agreement between Petitioner

and the Landowners, and the Respondents.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Petitioner's mineral interests are derived from the uncommitted Petitioner's

Landowners' mineral interests.
2.

For purposes of the issues presented in this matter, Petitioner stands in the shoes

of the landowners from which his mineral interests are derived, and therefore, Petitioner's
equitable and legal rights and obligations are both derived from, and limited by, the acts and
omissions of Petitioner's Landowners.
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3.

Similarly, Carbon County's oil and gas rights and interests in this matter were

derived from Ms. Lea's apparent ownership of the parcel between 1992 and 1999, and its rights
and obligations are both derived from, and limited by, the acts and omissions of Ms. Lea.
4.

The Respondent operator made numerous written offers to the Landowners to

lease their mineral interests or to join the federal Drunkard's Wash Unit.
5.

Until the Board's spacing order in Cause No. 243-3, effective January 26, 2000,

was adopted, Petitioner's Landowners' interests did not reach to wells drilled off their property,
and Respondents had no obligation to extend offers to participate in the costs and production of
wells 5-94 and 5-266.
6.

However, assuming that prior to the effective date of the spacing order for wells

5-94 and 5-266, Respondents had an affirmative obligation to offer to Petitioner's Landowner's
an opportunity to participate in wells 5-94 and 5-266, the repeated written offers made by
Respondent(s) beginning in 1991 to lease mineral interests or to join the federal DW Unit
constitute good faith offers for purposes of Utah law requiring that good faith offers be made to a
landowner before the landowner may be deemed to be "nonconsenting."
7.

Petitioner's Landowners repeatedly failed to accept or to respond to the good faith

offers, and Petitioner's Landowners otherwise failed to take action to establish and protect their
interests in the subsurface gas or the production from the 5-94 well and the 5-266 well. The
Landowners' failure to respond to, or accept the offers, constitute a refusal and result in
Petitioner's Landowners becoming nonconsenting owners.
8.

In the facts of this case, as between the unit operators and those landowners who

Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Order
Docket No. 2000-009

are on notice oil and gas wells are planned to be drilled near their property, the unit operator does
not have a superior obligation to initiate a petition for a spacing order.
9.

In the absence of the Petitioner demonstrating that the Unit Operator wrongfully

or fraudulently delayed requesting a spacing order or wrongfully delayed the spacing order
procedure, the effective date of the pooling order shall be the date of the spacing order.
10.

Petitioner has failed to carry its burden of showing the Unit Operator wrongfully

delayed petitioning for a spacing order, or wrongfully prolonged the spacing order hearing
process.
11.

In the absence of a pooling or similar agreement between the Petitioner and

Operators, Petitioner may petition the Board for a forced pooling agreement.
12.

The statutory terms of the forced pooling agreement allow the Board to impose on

Petitioner and Petitioner's Landowners a "nonconsent penalty" of between 100% and 300% of
the costs described at Utah Code Ann. 40-6-6.5(4)(d)(i)(D), to compensate consenting owners for
the risks of drilling wells 5-94 and 5-266.
13.

Based upon what was known of the subsurface geology, the possibility the wells

would not be productive, and the increased risks inherent in drilling for coalbed methane in
general, a 225% nonconsent penalty is fair and reasonable.
14.

The 225% nonconsent penalty is also fair and reasonable when compared to the

nonconsent penalty awarded by the Board in a comparable matter involving the same producing
formations.
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ORDER
Based upon Petitioner's and Respondents' briefs, arguments, exhibits, testimony and
evidence submitted, and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth above, and good
cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

The Board grants Petitioner's request for a forced pooling order.

2.

The Board denies Petitioner's request that the pooling order be retroactive to the

date of first production for each of the Unit Wells.
3.

The effective date of the pooling order shall be the date of the spacing order,

January 26, 2000.
4.

Denies both Petitioner's and Respondents' requested terms of the pooling order

except to the extent those terms may agree with the pooling order terms described in this Order.
5.

In compliance with the statutory requirements for forced pooling order, the Board

orders the general terms of the pooling agreement be as follows:
All interests within Unit No. 1, are pooled for development and operation of such unit,
and all interests within Unit No. 2, are pooled for development and operation of such units.
Wells 5-94 and 5-266 are the unit wells for Unit No. 1 and No. 2 respectively. In compliance
with Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6.5 it is ordered:
(a)

That Hegarty, Petitioner's Landowners and Carbon County (as to the interest
acquired from Michelle Lea) be deemed nonconsenting owners in the 5-94 and
5-266 wells;

(b)

That RGC, TEXEP and DRU be deemed consenting owners in the 5-94 and 5-266
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wells and reimbursed for Hegarty, Petitioner's Landowners and Carbon County's
share of the costs out of production from the drilling unit attributable to their
respective tracts;
(c)

That Hegarty and Petitioner's Landowners shall be entitled to receive, subject to
royalty or similar obligations, the share of production from the 5-94 well
applicable to this interest in to Unit No. 1, and the 5-266 well applicable to this
interest in Unit No. 2,>and Carbon County shall be entitled to receive, subject to
royalty or similar obligations, the share of production from the 5-266 well
applicable to its interest in Unit No. 2, after the consenting parties have recovered
from their respective share of production the following amounts:

(d)

(A)

100% of the nonconsenting owners' share of the cost of surface equipment
beyond the wellhead connections, including stock tanks, separators,
treaters, pumping equipment, and piping;

(B)

100% of the nonconsenting owners' share of the estimated costs to plug
and abandon the well as determined by the Division staff;

(C)

100% of the nonconsenting owners' share of the cost of operation of the
well from the effective date of the order and continuing until the
consenting owners have recovered all costs; and

(D)

225%o of the nonconsenting owners' share of the costs of staking the
location, wellsite preparation, rights-of-way, rigging up, drilling,
reworking, recomputing, deepening or plugging back, testing, and
completing, and the cost of equipment in the well to and including the
wellhead connections.

That the consenting owners shall pay to the Petitioner's Landowners the royalty
provided for in their leases with Hegarty (being 1/8), proportionately reduced in
accordance with the pooling established by the Board;
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(e)

That the consenting owners shall pay to Carbon County a 1/8 royalty,
proportionately reduced in accordance with the pooling established by the Board,
in the 5-266 well and Unit No. 2, payable from its share of production until
recovery of the amounts set forth in (d) above;

(f)

That the operator of the 5-94 and 5-266 wells shall furnish any nonconsenting
owner with monthly statements specifying costs incurred, the quantity of gas
produced, and the amount of gas proceeds realized from the sale of the production
during the preceding month;

{£>

T\vat vrtvea. t t e cor^ttov% partes, \axt xw&v&l fayxv ^ w^^CQ^^to.g, WKVSX' s
relinquished interest all of the amounts specified above, the relinquished interest
shall automatically revert to the nonconsenting owner;

(h)

That RGC and TEXEP may release the suspended proceeds from the 5-94 and
5-266 wells in accordance with the foregoing;

6,

Pursuant to the stipulated agreement of the Petitioner and Respondent, the Board

orders that John Baza, Associate Director of the Utah Division of Oil, Gas & Mining, act as
mediator to assist the parties to negotiate such additional terms and provisions as are necessary
for continued operation of the spaced lands which are not inconsistent with the above-ordered
terms and conditions.
7.

If the parties are unable to mediate additional, mutually acceptable, proposed

terms of a pooling and operations agreement for each unit well for consideration by the Board,
John Baza shall act as hearing examiner and recommend in writing to the Board within 120 days
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of the date of this Order, those terms and conditions which he believes are just and reasonable,
and otherwise in compliance with the law and the Board's regulations. The proposed additional
terms shall address whether Petitioner shall be granted access to existing gas and water
transportation facilities, and if so, just and reasonable terms for allowing such access.
8.

Pursuant to Utah Administrative Code R641 and R649-10-1 through R649-10-2.2,

and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b and § 40-6, the Board has considered and decided this matter as a
formal adjudication.
9.

This Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order ("Order") is based

exclusively on evidence of record in the adjudicative proceeding or on facts officially noted, and
constitutes the signed written Order stating the Board's decision and the reasons for the decision,
all as required by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b and § 40-610, and Utah Administrative Code R641-109.
10.

Notice of Right to Seek Judicial Review by the Utah Supreme Court or to Request

Board Reconsideration: As required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-10(e) to -10(g), the Board
hereby notifies all parties in interest that they have the right to seek judicial review of this final
Board Order in this formal adjudication by filing a timely appeal with the Utah Supreme Court
within 30 days after the date that this Order is issued. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) and 16. As an alternative to seeking immediate judicial review, and not as a prerequisite to seeking
judicial review, the Board also hereby notifies parties that they may elect to request that the
Board reconsider this Order, which constitutes a final agency action of the Board. Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-13, entitled, "Agency Review - Reconsideration," states:
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1.

(a)

Within 20 days after the date that an Order is issued for which review by
the agency or by a superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is
unavailable, and if the Order would otherwise constitute final agency
action, any party may file a written request for reconsideration with the
agency, stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested,

(b)

Unless otherwise provided by statute, the filing of the request is not a
prerequisite for seeking judicial review of the Order.

2.

The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the agency and one copy shall
be sent by mail to each party by the person making the request.

3.

(a)

The agency head, or a person designated for that purpose, shall issue a
written Order granting the request or denying the request,

(b)

If the agency head or the person designated for that purpose does not issue
an Order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the request for
reconsideration shall be considered to be denied.

Id. The Board also hereby notifies the parties that Utah Administrative Code R641-110100, which is part of a group of Board rules entitled, "Rehearing and Modification of Existing
Orders," states:
Any person affected by a final Order or decision of the Board may file a petition for
rehearing. Unless otherwise provided, a petition for rehearing must be filed no later than
the 10th day of the month following the date of signing of the final Order or decision for
which the rehearing is sought. A copy of such petition will be served on each party to the
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proceeding no later than the 15th day of that month.
]d. Sec Utah Administrative Code R641-110-200 for the required contents of a Petition
for Rehearing. If there is any conflict between the deadline in Utah Code Ann § 63-46b-13 and
the deadline in Utah Administrative Code R641-110-100 for moving to rehear this matter, the
Board hereby rules that the later of the two deadlines shall be available to any party moving to
rehear this matter. If the Board later denies a timely petition for rehearing, the party may still
seek judicial review of the Order by perfecting a timely appeal with the Utah Supreme Court
within 30 days thereafter.
11.

The Board retains continuing jurisdiction over all the parties and over the subject

matter of this Cause, except to the extent said jurisdiction may be divested by the filing of a
timely appeal to seek judicial review of this Order by the Utah Supreme Court.
12.

For all purposes, the Chairman's signature on a faxed copy of this Order shall be

deemed the equivalent of a signed original
ISSUED this T~

day of October, 2000.

STATE OF UTAH
BOARD OF OIL, GAS & MINING

Dave D. Lauriski, Chairman
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proceeding no later than the 15th day of that month.
Id. See Utah Administrative Code R641-110-200 for the required contents of a Petition
for Rehearing. If there is any conflict between the deadline in Utah Code Ann § 63-46b-13 and
the deadline in Utah Administrative Code R641-110-100 for moving to rehear this matter, the
Board hereby rules that the later of the two deadlines shall be available to any party moving to
rehear this matter. If the Board later denies a timely petition for rehearing, the party may still
seek judicial review of the Order by perfecting a timely appeal with the Utah Supreme Court
within 30 days thereafter.
11.

The Board retains continuing jurisdiction over all the parties and over the subject

matter of this Cause, except to the extent said jurisdiction may be divested by the filing of a
timely appeal to seek judicial review of this Order by the Utah Supreme Court.
12.

For all purposes, the Chairman's signature on a faxed copy of this Order shall be

deemed the equivalent of a signed original.
ISSUED this

day of October, 2000.

STATE OF UTAH
BOARD OF OIL, GAS & MINING

By
Dave D. Lauriski, Chairman
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Thomas A. Mitchell
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P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857
Kurt E. Seel
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140857
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John Baza
Associate Director, Oil & Gas
Division of Oil, Gas & Mining
1594 West North Temple, Suite 1210
P.O. Box 145801
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-5801
(Hand Delivered)

Patrick Hegarty
27 C.R. 3025
P.O. Box 1317
Aztec, NM 87410
Synergy Operating, LLC
Patrick Hegarty, Tom Mullins, Glen Papp
P.O. Box 5513
Farmington, NM 87410
River Gas Corporation
Attention: Randy Allen
1300 McFarland Boulevard
N.E. Suite 300
Tuscaloosa, AL 35406-2233
Texaco Exploration and Production Inc.
Attention: Chuck Snure
P.O. Box 2100
Denver, CO 80201
John Palacios
729 North Molyneux
Price, UT 84501
Clifford L. Penses, Trustee of
Clifford L. & Esther E. Penses
Revocable Trust Dated 10/05/92
and Ronald L. Penses
1936 Highway F
Fredricktown, MO 63645
Western Mine Services, Inc.
P.O. Box 756
Price, UT 84501

Dominion-Reserves-Utah, Inc.
901 East Byrd Street
P.O. Box 26532
Richmond, VA 23219

United States of America
Bureau of Land Management
P.O. Box 45155
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0155

Utah School and Institutional
Trust Lands Administration
675 East 500 South, #500
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

Carbon County
120 East Main Street
Price, UT 84501

Intermountain Electronics, Inc.
P.O. Box 914
Price, UT 84501
Michelle Lea
754 Ramona Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84105-3144
Five Star Enterprises, Inc.
P.O. Box 488
Price, UT 84501
LaRue Layne, Teri Layne
& Kelly Layne-Benning
17243 Knapp Street
Northridge, CA 91325
Terry T. Olsen, Trustee under Trust Agrs.
Dated 11/5/85 & 9/25/87
#40C.R.5109
Bloomfield, NM 87413
Morris Orvill Alexander
1629 Maddux Lane
McLean, VA 22101
State of Utah
Department of Natural Resources
Division of Forestry, Fire & State Lands
1594 West North Temple, Suite 3520
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-5703

Longwall Sales and Service, Inc.
3175 South 125 West
Price, UT 84501
Rita Beck
5984 South Village III Road
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Omega Transworld, Inc. of Utah
2400 Leechburg Road
New Kensington, PA 15068
College of Eastern Utah
451 East 400 North
Price, UT 84501
Steven R. & Francine Woolstenhulme
426 West 2900 South
Price, UT 84501
Chevron USA Inc.
Chevron Tower Complex
1301 McKinney
Houston, TX 77010
David Swenson
2269 North Hill Crest Drive
Price, UT 84501
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Supreme Court of Utah.
Callie COWLING, Marie Grubbs, Marguerite
Wilson, Robert Baird, Ed Baird, Jr.,
and The Adra Baird Estate, through its CoExecutors, Ed Baird, Jr., and Robert
Baird, Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.
The BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING,
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
FOR the STATE
OF UTAH, and Celsius Energy Company, a
Nevada corporation, Defendants and
Appellants.
No. 860518.
Dec. 31, 1991.
Rehearing Denied March 31,1992.
Appeal was taken from order of the District Court, Salt
Lake County, Leonard H. Russon, J., ruling that the
Board of Oil, Gas and Mining erred in making pooling
order for oil and gas well retroactive to date of first
production. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that
Board of Oil, Gas and Mining erred in ruling that
pooling order for gas well was required to be made
retroactive to date of first production, rather than to
date of entry of spacing order, absent inequitable
conduct on part of landowners.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes

[3] Mines and Minerals <@^47
260k47
While the Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act modifies
law of capture, it does not wholly displace that law; in
essence, Act establishes regulatory scheme that
protects correlative rights, while also continuing law of
capture to limited extent. U.C.A.1953,40-6-1 et seq.
[4] Mines and Minerals <@^47
260k47
Before spacing order is entered, "correlative right" is
right to undifferentiated and unquantifiable interest in
oil or gas pool beneath one's land. U.C.A.1953,40-6-1
et seq.
[5] Mines and Minerals <®=>92.23(1)
260k92.23(l)
(Formerly 260k92.23)
Under the Oil and Gas Conservation Act, it is not
possible to ascertain a landowner's correlative rights
until the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining acquires the
necessary data in formal hearing, makesfindingsof
feet, and enters spacing and drilling unit order.
U.C.A.1953,40-6-1 et seq.
[6] Mines and Minerals <®=>47
260k47
[6] Mines and Minerals <®=^92.79
260k92.79
(Formerly 260k92.78)

[1J Administrative Law and Procedure <®^681.1
15Ak681.1
(Formerly 15 Ak681)

Voluntary pooling agreements and forced pooling
orders are mechanisms used to enforce correlative
rights. U.C.A.1953,40-6-6(5).

When lower court reviews order of administrative
agency and Supreme Court exercises appellate review
of lower court's judgment. Supreme Court acts as if it
were reviewing administrative agency decision directly.

[7J Mines and Minerals <©^92.79
260k92.79
(Formerly 260k92.78)

[2] Mines and Minerals <®^>47
260k47
Under law of capture, landowner incurred no liability
for causing oil or gas to migrate across property
boundaries and was not required to compensate
adjoining landowners for draining oil and gas from
their lands.

Pooling order must be based on existence of drilling
unit. U.C.A.1953,40-6-6(5).
[8J Mines and Minerals <@=>92.80
260k92.80
Under forced pooling order, nonconsenting working
interest owner's share of drilling costs is deducted from
that owner's share of production; payout must be
achieved before owner is entitled to share in
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production. U.C.A. 1953,40-6-6(6).

U.C.A.1953, 40-6-6(5).

[9| Mines and Minerals <®=>92.80
260k92.80

[14] Mines and Minerals <@^92.79
260k92.79

Nonconsenting working interest owners are subject to
penalties rangingfrom150% to 200% of cost of
drilling well in unit in order to compensate working
interest owners for assumingrisksof not receiving their
investment and for their upfront payment of drilling
costs. U.C.A.1953, 40-6-6(5, 6).

Board of Oil, Gas and Mining erred in ruling that
pooling order for gas well was required to be made
retroactive to date offirstproduction, rather than to
date of entry of spacing order, absent inequitable
conduct on part of landowners. U.C.A.1953,40-6-6(5)

[10] Mines and Minerals <@^=>92.79
260k92.79

[15] Mines and Minerals <§^92J9
260k92.79

Because Oil and Gas Conservation Act authorizes
pooling orders to be entered only with respect to
established drilling units and because pooling order
that pools working interest must take into account costs
of drilling, by implication statutory scheme
contemplates that pooling orders shall be retroactive to
date of first production, but only if spacing order was
then in effect. U.C.A.1953,40-6-6(5, 6).

With respect to wildcat or exploratory wells, where no
preexisting field-wide spacing order has been entered,
pooling order should be effective no earlier than date of
spacing order, unless there are special circumstances
which would make it just and equitable for order to be
retroactive to protect correlative rights established by
the Oil and Gas Conservation Actfrominequitable or
overreaching conduct. U.C.A.1953, 40-6-1 etseq.

[11] Mines and Minerals <®=*92.79
260k92.79
(Formerly 260k92.78)

[16] Mines and Minerals <§^92.79
260k92.79

Even though statewide well-location rule prohibits
drilling at certain locations, it does not establish basis
for defining legal interests in a pool. U.C.A.1953,
40-6-1 et seq.
[12] Mines and Minerals <®=>92.23(1)
260k92.23(l)
(Formerly 260k92.23)
Owner's failure to take action to establish and protect
his or her interest in production prior to entry of
spacing order constitutes waiver of that interest until
drilling unit is established.
[13] Mines and Minerals <®=^92.79
260k92.79
If operator of well engages in inequitable conduct by
wrongfully delaying application for spacing order,
thereby prejudicing another's correlative right, Board of
Oil, Gas and Mining may make appropriate
adjustments as to date pooling order is effective; that
is, pooling order may be made effective prior to entry
of spacing order to offset any inequitable delay by
operator in pursuing petition for spacing order.

If operator of successful wildcat well wrongfully delays
petitioning for a spacing order or wrongfully prolongs
hearing process, Board of Oil, Gas and Mining may
make a pooling order retroactive to date of application
for spacing order, or possibly to prior time.
U.C.A.1953, 40-6-1 etseq.
*221 Donald S. Coleman, Mark C. Moench, and
David L. Wilkinson, Salt Lake City, for Bd. of Oil, Gas
&Min.
Phillip Lear, Alan Sullivan, and Ruland J. Gill, Salt
Lake City, for Celsius Energy.
Rosemary Beless, Albert J. Colton, and Anthony L.
Rampton, Salt Lake City, for Robert and Ed Baird,
Marguerite Wilson, Callie Cowling, and Estate of Adra
Baird.
STEWART, Justice:
Celsius Energy Company is a working interest owner
and the operator of the Ucolo No. 2 well, which was
drilled on property leasedfromAdra Baird and, after
her death,fromher heirs. Adra Baird executed three
leases conveying the mineral interests in her 110.14
acres to Celsius. [FN1] The Baird property is located
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in the north half of section 10 in a township of San Juan
*222 County, Utah. Celsius completed the well in the
Desert Creek zone on April 19, 1983, but the well was
not connected to a production pipeline until November
1983. Also on April 19, 1983, Celsius executed a
voluntary declaration of pooling pursuant to the three
Baird leases covering the 110.14- acre Baird tract.
The leases entitled the Bairds to a 1/6 royalty.
FN I. An entity named K.OGO also owns part
of the working interest and operating rights.
Celsius paid 100 percent of landowner's royalties from
the time of first production until the entry of the Board's
pooling order to Adra Baird and, after her death, to her
heirs (plaintiffs in the court below and hereinafter
collectively referred to as "the Bairds"). Celsius also
had an oil and gas lease covering a federally owned
tract which constituted the remainder of the north half
of section 10 and adjoined the Baird tracts. Since
Ucolo No. 2 was the discovery well of the pool it
drained, there was no spacing order in effect when the
well was completed. In 1983, Celsius petitioned the
Board of Oil, Gas and Mining ("the Board") for a
spacing order. Celsius preliminarily indicated that the
area drained by Ucolo No. 2 might include part of the
federal tract, in addition to the Baird tracts. However,
since Celsius had not acquired sufficient data to show
the actual area drained, the initial proceeding for a
spacing order was dismissed.
In early January 1985, Celsius again applied to the
Board for a single-well spacing and drilling unit order
for the gas pool drained by Ucolo No. 2. After the
Board held evidentiary hearings, the parties agreed to
the size and configuration of the pool. On March 28,
1985, the Board issued findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and a spacing and pooling order based on the
evidence adduced and the parties' stipulation.
The Board found that Ucolo No. 2 drained a
300.14-acre area, of which the Baird heirs owned
110.14 acres and the Bureau of Land Management (the
"BLM") owned 190 acres. On June 24, 1985,
pursuant to a stipulation by the Bairds, Celsius, and the
BLM, the Board modified its prior findings and order,
finding that the area drained by the well was 200.14
acres, 110.14 acres of which were owned by the Bairds
and 90 acres by the BLM. That order required a
pooling of the Bairds' and the BLM's interests in the
200.14-acre drilling unit. Over the dissent of two
Board members, the Board made the pooling order
retroactive to the first day of the first month of

production, April 1, 1983. The Board also found that
Celsius had paid the Bairds $230,000 in royalties from
the time of first production to the date of the Board's
pooling order and ruled that the BLM was entitled to a
share of those royalties based on the BLM's percentage
of land in the drilling unit drained by Ucolo No. 2.
The Bairds appealed the Board's ruling that the
pooling order should be retroactive to the date of first
production to the district court. They argued that the
Board's order deprived them of a vested right to all the
royalties from Ucolo No. 2 from first production until
entry of the spacing and pooling order. The district
court ruled that the Board erred in making the pooling
order retroactive and that the pooling order should have
been made effective as of the time the spacing order
was entered. The district court reasoned that the BLM
could have protected its interest in the gas drained from
its acreage in the north half of section 10 in one of two
ways. First, the BLM might have petitioned the Board
for an exception to Board Rule C-3(b), a statewide well
location rule, and drilled its own well. Second, the
BLM could have petitioned for a spacing and a pooling
order at an earlier time than Celsius did.
Celsius and the Board appealed from the district court
order to this Court. The BLM has not joined in the
appeal. Celsius argues three interrelated points in
support of its position that the pooling order should be
retroactive to the date of first production. First,
Celsius argues that this case is governed by Bennion v.
Utah State Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 675 P.2d 1135
(Utah 1983), which held that the Board did not err in
making a pooling order retroactive to the date of first
production to protect an adjoining landowner's
correlative rights. Second, Celsius argues that because
the statewide well location rule, Rule C-3(b),
prohibited the BLM, as an adjoining landowner, *223
from drilling a well on its own tract in section 10, the
pooling order had to be retroactive to the date of first
production to protect the BLM's correlative rights.
That rule, Celsius argues, in effect nullified the right of
the BLM to protect the BLM's rights under the law of
capture by prohibiting it from drilling on its own land.
Third, Celsius relies on the authority of
Farmer's
Irrigation District v. Schumacher, 187 Neb. 825, 194
N.W.2d 788 (1972), for the proposition that the
pooling order must be retroactive in order to protect the
correlative rights of the United States.
The Bairds' position is that correlative rights in oil and
gas are dependent on the provisions of the Utah Oil and
Gas Conservation Act and are defined by spacing
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orders. Specifically, the Bairds assert that until the
Board enters a spacing order, the correlative rights of
adjoining interest owners are neither defined nor
definable with any particularity. Since the spacing and
pooling orders in this case were entered at the same
time, the pooling order could not be retroactive to first
production because the BLM had no specifically
defined correlative right prior to entry of the spacing
order. The Bairds argue that
Bennion is
distinguishable because first production in that case
occurred after entry of the spacing order. Therefore,
the pooling order in Bennion was properly retroactive
to the date of first production. They also assert that the
statewide well location rule does not wholly displace
the law of capture, but rather, that their interest in all
the landowner's royalties was protected up to the time
of first production by the law of capture.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] We turn first to the standard of review to be
applied to the decision of a lower court reviewing an
order of an administrative agency. When a lower court
reviews an order of an administrative agency and we
exercise appellate review of the lower court's judgment,
we act as if we were reviewing the administrative
agency decision directly. Bennion v. Utah State Bd. of
Oil, Gas & Mining Co., 675 P.2d 1135, 1139 (Utah
1983). We do not defer, or accord a presumption of
correctness, to the lower court's decision, since that
court's review of the administrative record is no more
advantaged than ours.
The Board and Celsius argue that this Court should
defer to the Board's ruling on the ground that the issue
before the Board was a mixed question of fact and law.
Specifically, they assert that the issue is whether it was
"just and reasonable" within the meaning of Utah Code
Ann. § 40-6-6(5) for the Board to make the pooling
order retroactive to first production to protect the
BLM's correlative rights. They also assert that the
Board acted reasonably and within its discretion and
that this Court must therefore defer to the Board's
ruling. The Bairds, on the other hand, contend that the
central issue is when did the BLM's correlative rights
come into existence under the provisions of the Utah
Oil and Gas Conservation Act. That issue, the Bairds
argue, is an issue of law.
In 1985, after Bennion was decided, the Legislature
amended the Oil and Gas Conservation Act. Utah
Code Ann. § 40-6-12(1) (Supp. 1985) established the
scope ofjudicial review of Board orders. [FN2] That

section provides in part:
FN2. The Legislature has since adopted the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA),
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to -22 (1989 &
Supp. 1991), which establishes uniform
standards for judicial review of administrative
agency actions. Section 63-46b-22(2) of the
Act states that all agency adjudicative
proceedings commenced "on or before
December 31, 1987" are governed by
"[statutes and rules governing agency action,
agency review, and judicial review ... in effect
on December 31, 1987...." Because the action
in this case was commenced before December
31, 1987, the provisions of the Oil and Gas
Conservation Act control. Nevertheless, the
outcome would be the same under UAPA.

An appeal from a rule or order of the board, except
appeals from orders issued under Section 40-6-9,
shall be a trial on the record and not be considered
a trial de novo. The Court shall set aside the board
action if it is found to be:
(a) Unreasonable, unjust, arbitrary, capricious, or
an ?buse of discretion;
*224 Osr) Contrary to constitutional right, power,
privilege, or immunity;
(c) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations;
(d) Not in compliance with procedure required by
law;
(e) Based upon a clearly erroneous interpretation or
application of the law; or
(f) As to an adjudicative proceeding, unsupported
by substantial evidence on the record.
Both the Bairds and Celsius argue, somewhat offhandedly, that their conflicting claims to the prepooling order royalties are based on a constitutional
right to a vested property interest. The Bairds assert
that their property right arises under the law of capture,
while Celsius contends that the BLM's right is based on
the law of correlative rights. These positions invoke
subparagraph (b) of § 40-6-12(1), which would require
the application of correction-of-error standard.
The parties' positions, however, are really rooted in
issues of statutory construction. The issue of where
the law of capture ends and the law of correlative rights
begins, at least with respect to compulsory pooling
orders, is a question of state statutory law, not
constitutional law. We do not, therefore, decide this
issue under subparagraph (b), but rather under
subparagraph (c). The issues that arise under that
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provision are issues of law, and we therefore accord no
deference to the Board's resolution.
Although we recognize that in Bennion we deferred to
the Board's ruling holding a pooling order retroactive to
the time offirstproduction,firstproduction in that case
occurred after the entry of a spacing order. For reasons
that appear below, that fact is critical and, in essence,
changes the nature of the issue before the Court.
n. CORRELATIVE RIGHTS
[2] The law of capture applies in all jurisdictions until
modified by state law. 1 Williams & Meyers, Oil and
Gas Law § 204.4 (1986). Under the common law of
capture, a landowner could drill for oil or gas on its
land wherever and with as many wells as the landowner
thought appropriate. If oil or gas were found, the
landowner would not be liable to adjacent landowners
whose lands were also drained, even if the producing
well were drilled next to the adjoining landowner's
boundary. Moreover, the producing landowner would
be entitled to produce as much oil or gas as possible,
even though the ultimate recovery of oil or gasfromthe
reservoir was diminished. Thus, under the law of
capture, a landowner incurred no liability for causing
oil or gas to migrate across property boundaries and
was not required to compensate adjoining landowners
for draining oil and gasfromtheir lands. Thompson v.
Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 68, 57
S.Ct. 364, 370, 81 L.Ed. 510 (1937);
Champlin
Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210,
233, 52 S.Ct. 559, 564, 76 L.Ed. 1062 (1932); Brown
v. Spilman, 155 U.S. 665, 669-70, 15 S.Ct. 245,
246-47, 39 L.Ed. 304 (1895); 1 William & Meyers,
Oil and Gas Law § 204.4, at 55-57 (1986).
We described the consequences of the law of capture
on early drilling and production practices in Bennion v.
Utah State Bd of Oil Gas & Mining, 675 P.2d, 1135,
1137 (Utah 1983):
This rule of law produced results that were unfair
to many landowners and development practices that
were uneconomical or wasteful for all. Thus, it
encouraged the drilling of more wells than
necessary to drain afield,and it permitted
techniques and rates of production that augmented
the profits of the property owner whose land was
producing, but wasted the resources of the field as
a whole. Allen, "An Argument for Enforced Unit
Development of Oil and Gas Reservoirs in Utah," 7
UtahL.Rev. 197(1960). Legislative remedies
were required.

In 1955, the Legislature enacted the Utah Oil and Gas
Conservation Act. That Act modified the law of
capture and established the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and
Mining to regulate the development and production of
oil and gas in the state for the
(^225/purpose of
preventing waste and protecting correlative rights. The
Act was amended and superseded by the Utah Oil and
Gas Conservation Act of 1983. See Utah's Oil & Gas
Conservation Act of1983. 5 J. Energy L. & Pol'y 49
(1984). The 1983 Act was intended to promote the
following purposes, among others: the development of
oil and gas in a manner that would (1) prevent waste;
(2) provide for the development and operation of oil
and gas properties so as to maximize ultimate recovery;
and (3) protect the "correlative rights of all owners."
Utah Code Ann.
§ 40-6-1 (Supp. 1983). These
objectives are significantly interrelated.
[3] To achieve these ends, the Act authorizes the
Board to limit a landowner's right to drill as many wells
and in whatever locations on its land as the landowner
chooses. Although the Act modifies the law of
capture, it does not wholly displace that law, contrary
to the position of the Board and Celsius. See generally
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Blankenship, 85 F.2d 553,
555 (5th Cir.1936); Desormeaux v. Inexco Oil Co.,
298 So.2d 897 (La.Ct.App.), writ refused, 302 So.2d
37 (1974). In essence, the Act establishes a regulatory
scheme that protects correlative rights, while also
continuing the law of capture to a limited extent. See
generally Carter Oil Co. v. State, 205 Okl. 541, 240
P.2d 787, 790 (1951).
The Legislature initially defined correlative rights as
"the owners' or producers'just and equitable share in a
pool." Utah Code Ann. § 40-6- 4(j) (Supp.1955). In
the 1983 Act, however, the Legislature amended that
definition to mean the "opportunity of each owner in a
pool to produce his just and equitable share of the oil
and gas in a pool without waste." Utah Code Ann.
§
40-6-2(2) (1988). By defining correlative rights to be
a "just and equitable share" in a pool, the statute makes
individual correlative rights dependent upon the
overriding objective of obtaining the greatest
production possible from the pool, and notfromany
particular well or property. The definition of
correlativerightsdoes not, therefore, give a mineral
interest owner an absolute right to all the oil or gas
under one's land. Moreover, the term "without waste"
is crucial because it imposes a duty upon the Board to
ensure maximum recovery of the resource.
See
generally Ohmart v. Dennis,
188 Neb. 260, 196
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N.W.2d 181 (1972).
[4] In essence, a landowner's correlative right is a
unique property right. Before a spacing order is
entered, a correlative right is a right to an
undifferentiated and unquantifiable interest in an oil or
gas pool beneath one's land. The right initially is
nothing more than an "opportunity" to produce a "just
and equitable share" of oil and gas "without waste."
The mechanism for defining correlative rights in a pool
of oil or gas is a spacing order, which establishes fieldwide drilling units. Section 40-6- 6(1) authorizes the
Board to establish drilling units covering "any pool" of
oil or gas. The order establishing the drilling units
must "cover all lands ... underlaid by the pool."
§
40-6-6(3). All drilling units "shall be of uniform size
and shape for the entire pool unless the board finds that
it must make an exception due to geologic or
geographic or other factors." Id. The order must
specify "the acreage to be embraced within each
drilling unit... but the unit shall not be smaller than the
maximum area that can be efficiently and economically
drained by one well." § 40-6-6( 1 )(a). Only one well
may be drilled "from the common source of supply on
any drilling unit." § 40-6-6(1 )(b). The Board may
modify its original order on the basis of additional
evidence "to include additional areas determined to be
underlaid by the pool." §40-6-6(3). Once the Board
fixes the size of the drilling units in a field, "the drilling
of any well into the pool at a location other than
authorized by the order is prohibited." § 40-6-6(4).
The Board's determination of the size of the drilling
units in a field is necessarily a discretionary
determination based on the acreage that wells in the
field can efficiently drain so as to maximize production
from the pool as a whole and minimize the waste of oil
and gas. See §40-6-6(1). The determination *226
must, however, be based on geologic and reservoir
engineering evidence pertaining to a number of factors,
including; the reservoir's physical characteristics, such
as the strength and nature of the pressures within the
reservoir and the size and type of the producing
formation; the porosity and permeability of the sands
in which the hydrocarbons are trapped and through
which they must move; available technology, including
methods and resources for secondary and tertiary
recovery; and, far from least, economic considerations
such as the market price of oil and gas and extraction
costs. It is, however, impossible to extract all the oil
and gas from a pool, even with secondary and tertiary
enhanced recovery techniques.

When a successful exploratory well is initially drilled,
it is ordinarily impossible to determine with any degree
of precision what area the well drains or the
characteristics and extent of the pool. After the initial
discovery is made, however, geologic and reservoir
engineering data can be developed which enable the
Board to fix the size of the drilling units needed to drain
the reservoir efficiently. Landowners' correlative
rights are then definable based on each landowner's
fractional share of the total surface ownership within a
particular drilling unit. See §40-6-6(6). Of course,
not all the wells will produce equal volumes of oil or
gas. Thus, the actual value of an interest owner's
interest in a particular drilling unit will vary depending
on the productivity of the well. Accordingly, a
fractional interest in one drilling unit may have greater
value than the same fractional interest in another
drilling unit in the same field.
[5] In short, under the Act, it is not possible to
ascertain a landowners' correlative rights until the
Board acquires the necessary data in a formal hearing,
makesfindingsof fact, and enters a spacing and drilling
unit order.
The following example illustrates the relative nature of
landowners' correlative rights on the Board's judgment
in determining the size of drilling units in a field. If the
Board fixes 160 acres as the size of a drilling unit, the
correlative rights of adjoining landowners in such a unit
will be different than if the unit is fixed at 80 acres. A
reduction of a drilling unit from 160 acres to 80 acres
could increase or decrease a landowner's share in the
unit. Indeed, the Board in this case modified the size of
the drilling unit after additional evidence was adduced,
from 300.14 acres to 200.14 acres, thereby decreasing
the BLM's correlative rights.
[6][7][8][9][10] Voluntary pooling agreements and
forced pooling orders are the mechanisms used to
enforce correlative rights. [FN3] Pooling orders are
based on each landowner's fractional share of surface
ownership in a drilling unit. See § 40-6-6(5), (6). A
pooling order must, therefore, be based on the
existence of a drilling unit. [FN4] See *221 generally,
6 Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law
§ 905.2
(1986). Indeed, § 40-6-6(6) of the Act contemplates
that a pooling order shall be made with respect to a
particular drilling unit. That section states in part:
FN3. Utah Code Ana § 40-6-6(5) provides:
Two or more owners within a drilling unit may
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pool their interests for the development and
operation of the unit. In the absence of
voluntary pooling, the board may enter an
order pooling all interests in the drilling unit for
the development and operation. The order
shall be made upon terms and conditions that
are just and reasonable. Operations incident to
the drilling of a well upon any portion of a unit
covered by a pooling order shall be deemed
for all purposes to be the conduct of the
operations upon each separately owned tract in
the unit by the several owners. That portion
of the production allocated or applicable to
each tract included in a unit covered by a
pooling order shall, when produced, be
deemed for all purposes to have been
produced from each tract by a well drilled
thereon.
FN4. A working interest owner who does not
enter into a voluntary pooling order with an
operator incurs no out-of-pocket costs of
drilling, no risk of a dry hole, and even if there
is some production, no risk that the cost of
drilling will exceed production proceeds.
Therefore, under a forced pooling order, a
nonconsenting working interest owner's share
of drilling costs is deducted from that owner's
share of production. Payout must be achieved
before the owner is entitled to share in the
production. Bennion v. Utah State Bd. of Oil,
Gas & Mining, 675 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1983);
Utah Code Ana
§ 40-6-6(6), (7).
Nonconsenting owners are also subject to

penalties rangingfrom150% to 200% of
the cost of drilling a well in the unit in
order to compensate the working interest
owners for assuming the risks of not
recovering their investment and for their
up-frontpayment of the drilling costs.
Cf. In re SAM Oil, 817 P.2d 299 (Utah
1991).
Each pooling order shall permit the drilling and
operation of a well on the drilling unit by any
owner within the drilling unit, and shall provide for
the payment of the costs, including a reasonable
charge for supervision and storage facilities, as
provided in this subsection.
Because § 40-6-6(5) authorizes pooling orders to be
entered only with respect to established drilling units
and because a pooling order that pools working
interests must take into account the costs of drilling, by
implication the statutory scheme contemplates that
pooling orders shall be retroactive to the date of first

production, see Bennion, 675 P.2d at 1142, but only if
a spacing order was then in effect.
Although a pooling order theoretically could be made
retroactive to the date offirstproductionfroman
exploratory or wildcat well, even though that date is
prior to the entry of a spacing order, the Act does not
contemplate that result. Retroactivity of a pooling
order under those circumstances would give adjoining
interest owners correlative rights before those rights
are definable. This view is supported by cases from
other jurisdictions. For example, Oklahoma courts
have held that a pooling order may not be retroactive to
a date prior to a spacing order, because it is a spacing
order that establishes and defines correlativerightsand
abrogates the law of capture. Ward v. Corporation
Comm'n, 501 P.2d 503 (Okla.1972); Wood Oil Co. v.
Corporation Comm'n, 205 Okl. 537, 239 P.2d 1023
(1950); Barton v. Cleary Petroleum Corp., 566 P.2d
462 (Okla.Ct.App.1977). Significantly, Oklahoma,
like Utah, places great importance on the protection of
correlative rights. See Kingwood Oil Co. v.
Corporation Comm'n, 396 P.2d 1008 (Okla.1964).
The law in other jurisdictions also holds that pooling
orders may not be retroactive to a time prior to the
entry of a spacing order, in some cases on
constitutional grounds because it would impair rights
that vested under the law of capture. See, e.g., Pierce
v. Goldking Properties, Inc.,
396 So.2d 528
(La.Ct.App. 1981); Desormeauxv. Inexco Oil Co.,
298 So.2d 897 (La.Ct.App. 1974); Buttes Resources
Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,
732 S.W.2d 675
(Tex.Ct.App. 1987); Ward v. Corporation Comm'n,
501 P.2d 503 (Okla. 1972).
See also Mitchell v.
Simpson, 493 P.2d 399 (Wyo.1972); 5 Eugene Kuntz,
Oil and Gas § 77.3, at 398-99 (1978).
Although courts in North Dakota and Nebraska have
sustained pooling orders that were retroactive to a date
prior to the entry of a spacing order, those cases are
distinguishable. In Texaco Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n,
448 N.W.2d 621 (N.D.I989), the court held that a
pooling order should be retroactive tofirstproduction
from a wildcat well because of a statute unlike Utah's
that established a procedure for and required the entry
of a temporary spacing order within thirty days of
completion of such a well. The court stated that if a
wildcat well "is drilled on land not covered by a
spacing order, the Commission must docket a spacing
hearing within thirty days and thereafter issue a
temporary spacing order." Id. at 623.
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Nebraska also allows a pooling order to be retroactive
to a date prior to the entry of a spacing order, but only
to remedy inequitable conduct by the operator of a well.
In In Re Farmers Irrigation Dist., 187 Neb. 825, 194
N.W.2d 788 (1972), a case Celsius relies on, the court
recognized the inequity that can be caused by a
retroactive pooling order because such an order would
permit an "adjoining owner to sit back and await the
successful outcome of drilling operations without
asking for a pooling agreement...." Id. 194 N.W.2d at
792. Nevertheless, the coun sustained a pooling order
that was retroactive to first production, because of the
well operator's "obvious delaying tactics." Id. at 792.
We do not disagree in principle with that result, but as
stated below, there were no obvious delaying tactics in
this case.
*228 Contrary to appellants' contention, Bennion v.
Utah State Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 675 P.2d 1135
(Utah 1983), does not require the pooling order in this
case to be retroactive to first production. In Bennion,
the Board had issued field-wide spacing orders for the
Bluebell, Altamont, and Cedar Rim-Sink Draw Fields
in 1971 and 1972. A producing well was completed
July 7, 1974, in an area covered by a spacing order.
Although Bennion sustained an adjoining working
interest owner's rights in first production, the entry of
the spacing order preceded the date of first production.
Bennion simply did not address the precise question
whether a pooling order could be retroactive to first
production when made prior to the entry of a spacing
order.
Celsius argues that the rationale in Bennion controls.
The Bennion Court justified the retroactivity of the
pooling order on the ground that the spacing order
prohibited an adjoining interest owner within the
drilling unit from drilling on his or her own land.
Celsius asserts that here, the statewide well-location
rule, Rule C-3(b), prevented the BLM from drilling on
that part of its tract located in section 10 and that
therefore the BLM was entitled to a pooling order
retroactive to the date of first production. There is,
however, a significant difference between a spacing
order and Rule C- 3(b).
Rule C-3(b) prohibits the location of wells within
certain distances of boundary lines and other wells. Its
purposes include the prevention of waste by avoiding
unnecessary dissipation of reservoir pressures before a
spacing order specifically tailored to a field can be
entered. That purpose justifies a limitation on well
locations before a spacing order is entered. The minor

restriction of a landowner's right to drill under the law
of capture does not mean, however, that the law of
correlative rights attaches.
[11] Thus, Rule C-3(b) does not wholly nullify the law
of capture. As long as the narrow limitations of that
rule are not violated, a well may be drilled anywhere.
Even though the rule prohibits drilling at certain
locations, it does not establish a basis for defining legal
interests in a pool. In Carter Oil Co. v. State, 205
Okl. 541,240 P.2d 787 (1951), the Oklahoma
Supreme Court addressed the effect of a similar rule
governing the general location of wells outside areas
covered by field spacing orders. The Court stated:
"We cannot subscribe to the contention presented that
the effect of the Commission rule 202 establishes the
acreage as a well-spacing and drilling unit. That rule
simply establishes the location of a drilling site and no
more." Id. 240 P.2d at 794.
[12] Moreover, Rule C-3(e) expressly allows an
adjoining interest owner to petition the Board for an
exception location. An adjoining mineral estate owner
who is prevented from drilling a well may also seek to
enter into a voluntary pooling agreement to protect that
interest. See Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(5). An
owner's failure to take action to establish and protect
his or her interest in production prior to the entry of a
spacing order constitutes a waiver of that interest until
a drilling unit is established.
See Ohio Oil Co. v.
Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 20 S.Ct. 576, 44 L.Ed. 729
(1900); Exxon Corp. v. Thompson, 564 So.2d 387
(La.Ct.App. 1990).
[13] We have held that the statutory prerequisite for a
pooling order is the existence of a spacing order and
that a spacing order defines the fractional interests in a
drilling unit as of the date of the spacing order. I£
however, an operator of a well engages in inequitable
conduct by wrongfully delaying an application for a
spacing order, thereby prejudicing another's correlative
right, the Board may make appropriate adjustments as
to the date the pooling order is effective. That is, a
pooling order may be made effective prior to the entry
of a spacing order to offset any inequitable delay by the
operator in pursuing a petition for a spacing order.
Section 40-6- 6(5) specifically states that the Board
may enter a pooling order "upon terms that are just and
reasonable." Clearly, the statutory scheme
contemplates prompt action in the prosecution of a
petition for a spacing order.
*229 [14] The Board's critical conclusions of law in
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this case were as follows:
24. Section 40-6-6(5) requires that the Board pool
upon terms that are just and reasonable. This
would mean that each owner in the pool is entitled
to share in the benefits of production in proportion
to their ownership of the pool. In the ordinary
cases, this is accomplished by allowing each owner
in a spacing unit to participate in production from
the well from first production. The Board has the
power and authority to make pooling effective as of
first production. However, there may be
circumstances in which such application of this rule
would not be just and reasonable; and in such
cases the Board has the power and authority to
make the pooling effective as of another date.
25. Upon completion of the UCOLO well No. 2 as
a gas well, rule C-3-(b) of the Board's General
Rules and Regulations which establishes statewide
spacing in the absence of special field/pool spacing
precludes the drilling for the production of an
additional Desert Creek gas well in the N 1/2 of
Section 10. Thus, the general rule which we stated
which makes pooling effective as of first
production should apply in the absence of special
circumstances which would make pooling as of
such date not just and reasonable. We find no such
circumstances in this case,
[15][16] The Board, in applying the rule formulated in
Bennion v. Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, erred as a matter
of law. Bennion dealt with a spacing order that was
entered before the well was completed. The pooling
order was properly made retroactive to first production
because that was after entry of the spacing order. With
respect to wildcat or exploratory wells, however, where
no preexisting field-wide spacing order has been
entered, the rule is that a pooling order should be
effective no earlier than the date of a spacing order,
unless there are special circumstances which would
make it just and equitable for an order to be retroactive
to protect correlative rights established by the Act from

inequitable or overreaching conduct. Thus if the
operator of a successful wildcat well wrongiully delays
petitioning for a spacing order or wrongfully prolongs
the hearing process, the Board may make a pooling
order retroactive to the date of the application for a
spacing order, or possibly to a prior time.
Here, the Bairds cannot be charged with any kind of
wrongful delay. Celsius was the appropriate party for
filing a petition for a pooling order. The record
indicates that Celsius was not dilatory; indeed, it
appeared anxious for an early pooling order because it
wanted to avoid the effects of a federal compensatory
royalty. In fact, Celsius petitioned for a pooling order
before it had developed sufficient evidence to sustain
the order, causing it to subsequently withdraw its
petition. Furthermore, the BLM was aware that Ucolo
No. 2 had been completed in a known geologic
formation, providing it with some basis for surmising
that Ucolo No. 2 might drain gas from under the BLM
tract. Under those circumstances, the BLM might have
taken some action, but it did not. In all events, the
Bairds did not engage in any inequitable conduct or do
anything to delay entry of the spacing order.
In sum, the Board erred as a matter of law in ruling
that the general rule irr these circumstances is that a
pooling order should be retroactive to the date of first
production. Furthermore, there is no basis in this case
for concluding that it would have been appropriate to
invoke the "just and equitable" exception to the general
rule and to hold that the pooling order, on the particular
facts of this case, should have been made effective prior
to the entry of the spacing order.
We affirm the district court order.
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., and DURHAM
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
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